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If man is not made for God, why is he only happy with God? If man is made for God, 
why is he so hostile to God? 
Pascal, Pensees 
 
 
As one cannot deny that this is a gift of God, so one must understand that there are other 
gifts of God for the children of that free Jerusalem which is above, our mother. 
Augustine, De Patientia, on the courageous and 
noble death of a heretic. 
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ABSTRACT 
Pietsch, Thomas, D. “Extra Nos but not Extraneous: Augustine’s De Natura et Gratia and 
Contemporary Receptions of Augustine.” STM thesis, Concordia Seminary, 2017. 116 pp. 
The relationship of nature to grace has become one of significant importance for 
contemporary theology. Following the turbulent debates surrounding Henri de Lubac in the 
twentieth century, theologians associated with Radical Orthodoxy have revived the importance 
of the relationship in more recent years. Whether acknowledged or not, all discussions of nature 
and grace owe much to Augustine, who was the first person to present a systematic discussion of 
the matter in his 415 anti-Pelagian treatise, De Natura et Gratia. But readings of Augustine have 
differed vastly, and have fueled debates not just around nature and grace, but also around what it 
means to be Augustinian. In this thesis, I review the relationship of nature to grace in the thought 
of Henri de Lubac, John Milbank, Michael Hanby, and others, as well as their readings of 
Augustine. Following this, I undertake an historical, exegetical, and theological survey of De 
Natura et Gratia and its context in the Pelagian debate. Rather than pit the exegetical against the 
ontological, or the historical against the systematic, I show how a faithful reading of Augustine 
has to pay close attention to the text while also engaging with his broader theological vision. 
This enables a richer appropriation of Augustine’s theology of nature and grace for today. I find 
that for Augustine the distinction between nature and grace must always be held strongly, and yet 
the two must never be ultimately played off against each other in a competitive, zero-sum game, 
for our corrupted nature only finds its fulfilment in the reception of external grace. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
RECENT AUGUSTINIAN ACCOUNTS OF NATURE AND GRACE 
The primary issue that animates this thesis is that of the relationship between nature and 
grace. All people, the just and unjust alike, receive the gift of human nature from God. But grace 
is that which comes on account of the death and resurrection of Christ, received through faith. 
Christians have long pondered the mystery of the relationship between the two, seeking to 
understand what it is that the grace of God does to our nature. Does grace rescue nature, or 
simply perfect it? Is grace opposed to nature, or complimentary to nature? Does nature seek 
grace, or refuse grace? If both grace and nature are God’s gifts through Christ Jesus, how can we 
even distinguish them? Augustine has been pivotal to the development of this discussion within 
the church. He has often been credited with arguing that man has a natural desire for God, 
expressed in his celebrated phrase at the beginning of Confessions: “You arouse us so that 
praising you may bring us joy, because you have made us and drawn us to yourself, and our heart 
is unquiet until it rests in you.”1 It can seem as if for Augustine we are all born on a quest for 
fulfilment which is completed only when we find Christ. And yet twenty years after the 
Confessions, in the Pelagian controversy, Augustine wrote with greater circumspection about the 
natural desire for God. In his 412–413 De Spiritu et Littera, for example, Augustine wrote that 
the desire for God comes not by nature but by the Holy Spirit. Christians “receive the Holy 
Spirit, so that there arises in their minds a delight in and a love for that highest and immutable 
                                                 
 
1 Conf., 1.1. 
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good that is God, even now while they walk by faith, not yet by vision.”2 J. Patout Burns has 
argued that Augustine’s development shows a clear rejection of his earlier confidence in the 
potentialities of nature.3 Others, such as Carol Harrison, have argued for much greater continuity 
in the young and late Augustine.4  
This tension in Augustine’s thought on the relationship between nature and grace is a 
reflection of the tension within the Christian tradition itself. In a text often cited in the history of 
the debate, St. Paul declares that “all things were created through him [Christ] and for him.”5 
According to the apostle, our created natures are fully understood only in Christ, and find their 
fulfilment in Christ alone, for whom we were created. It can seem as if our natures already 
anticipate Christ, our telos, before the reception of the Holy Spirit or sacramental grace. But then 
St. Paul in Romans attests to the limits of this approach, writing that “none is righteous, no, not 
one; no one understands; no one seeks for God,”6 and also to the Corinthians: “What no eye has 
seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, what God has prepared for those who love 
him, God has revealed to us through the Spirit.”7 While our natures are ordered towards Christ, 
St. Paul stops short of clearly proclaiming a natural desire for Christ and seems to leave open the 
tension succinctly expressed by Pascal in the seventeenth century: “If man is not made for God, 
why is he only happy with God? If man is made for God, why is he so hostile to God?”8 Pascal 
                                                 
 
2 Spir. et litt., 3.5. 
3 J. Patout Burns, The Development of Augustine’s Doctrine of Operative Grace (Paris: Etudes 
Augustiniennes, 1980). 
4 See Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), especially 60–63. 
5 Col. 1:16. 
6 Rom. 3:10–11. 
7 1 Cor. 2:9–10. 
8 Blaise Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings, ed. Anthony Levi, trans. Honor Levi (Oxford: Oxford 
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was writing in one of those periods of history in which the question of nature and grace was 
especially urgent and contested. The influence of Jansenism in Pascal’s day had led to a fierce 
debate about the relationship between nature and grace, as well as the connected question of 
what it meant to be genuinely Augustinian. Did God’s grace overwhelm the nature of those 
whom he had predestined, as the Jansenists had read Augustine to affirm, or was there also a 
kind of assent which our natures gave to the reception of grace, as the Jesuits argued? The 
condemnation of the Jansenists first by Innocent X in 1653, and then again—more definitively—
by Clement XI in 1713 helped to bring an end to the public debate within French Catholicism.  
In recent years, the relationship between nature and grace has again become pressing for 
the church. Precipitated in part by the civilizational threat of National Socialism, the French 
Jesuit Henri de Lubac issued a new challenge to those theologies which would separate nature 
and grace so much that the gospel could no longer speak meaningfully to the world of politics. 
According to de Lubac, it was this deficient turn in theology which had led to ecclesial 
complicity with National Socialism and which had insulated the world of nature from the 
potency of grace. De Lubac’s thought has been revived in the twenty-first century, in large part 
by the Radical Orthodoxy movement. Radical Orthodoxy was born primarily in Cambridge 
Anglicanism but has since extended its influence significantly within English-speaking theology 
especially. The context of Radical Orthodoxy is not the Third Reich, but rather the kind of 
totalitarian secularism that Benedict XVI has called “the dictatorship of relativism.” The 
relegation of grace and the church to a private realm away from the supposedly neutral secular 
sphere has provided context enough for a renewal of theological consideration of nature and 
                                                 
 
University Press, 2008), 8. 
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grace. But the dictatorship of relativism has threatened to strip the church even of its supposedly 
private functions, thus revealing, according to Radical Orthodoxy, the impossibility of religious 
neutrality for the nation-state. This context has provoked Radical Orthodoxy theologians to 
recover, in Lubacian fashion, an intrinsic relationship between nature and grace. As we shall see, 
the pre-eminent theologian of Radical Orthodoxy, John Milbank, has somewhat dangerously 
extended de Lubac’s theological vision to an even greater synthesis between nature and grace. Of 
particular interest to this thesis is Milbank’s claim to be doing this as an Augustinian. Indeed, 
Milbank originally intended for the movement to be called not Radical Orthodoxy, but 
Postmodern Critical Augustinianism.9 And one of the key texts in the Radical Orthodoxy book 
series has been Michael Hanby’s Augustine and Modernity, a learned and provocative work 
which has challenged the very definition of what it means to be Augustinian when it comes to 
the relationship of nature and grace. Does Augustine anticipate a modernist, Cartesian interiority 
which establishes an autonomous self without reference to God and the cosmos? Or does 
Augustine provide the antidote to such an extrinsic relationship of nature to grace? Put another 
way, how can Augustine’s anti-Pelagian theology of original sin be reconciled with his 
supposedly optimistic understanding of man’s natural desire for God?  
After reviewing these recent developments in chapter one, this thesis will then proceed to 
assess contemporary invocations of Augustine on nature and grace by holding them up to the 
doctor gratiae himself. As we shall see, contemporary Augustinian studies have taken a turn 
away from a strictly exegetical approach to Augustine’s works, deeming this to be insufficiently 
attentive to his broader vision. There are merits to this approach, but it can never be done despite 
                                                 
 
9 See John Milbank, “‘Postmodern Critical Augustinianism’: A Short Summa in Forty Two Responses to 
Unasked Questions,” Modern Theology 7, no. 3 (April 1991): 225–37. 
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the text, or in a way that does not square with the text. Reading Augustine closely in light of 
broader Augustinian scholarship is thus essential for any authentic Augustinian scholarship 
today. This will be done in this thesis by a reading of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian treatise of 415, 
De Natura et Gratia. While the relationship between nature and grace is anticipated in the 
Scriptures, it was Augustine who first identified and investigated the relationship in a formal 
way. All discussions of nature and grace are thus indebted to Augustine whether they 
acknowledge it or not. The theme arises throughout his writings and not only in his anti-Pelagian 
treatises. But it was in De Natura et Gratia, that Augustine most systematically and concertedly 
addressed the relationship. Alfred Vanneste has called De Natura et Gratia “le premier de 
l'histoire de la théologie chrétienne à confronter de façon formelle et directe les notions de 
nature, et de grâce.”10 And as the first treatment of this theological relationship, it remains 
important for all future considerations and definitions, especially for those claiming to be 
Augustinian. Given that nature and grace has become one of the more significant contemporary 
theological discussions, a close reading of De Natura et Gratia promises to be a crucial test-case 
in assessing the direction of Augustinian theology and scholarship today.11 Reinhard Hütter has 
written of the recent turn in Thomistic studies which has sought to place Thomas and his thought 
in its Sitz im Leben, paying attention to Thomas the theologian, the tradition of Dominican 
                                                 
 
10 “The first in the history of Christian theology to formally and directly address the notion of nature and 
grace.” Alfred Vanneste, Nature et Grâce Dans La Theologie Occidentale: Dialogue Avec H. de Lubac, Bibliotheca 
Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 127 (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 1996), 21–22. French translations are 
my own. 
11 Maarten Wisse has noted regarding recent Augustinian scholarship: “The relationship between 'nature' and 
'grace' is a major issue in the theology of the twentieth century, both in the Roman Catholic and Protestant 
tradition.” Maarten Wisse, “The First Modern Person? Twentieth-Century Theological Reception of Augustine,” ed. 
Karla Pollmann and Otten Willemien, The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 106, 109. 
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spirituality and other influences of his time, as well as his scholarly, philosophical output.12 In a 
similar fashion, this thesis thus seeks to look at Augustine’s De Natura et Gratia and the 
Pelagian controversy in situ in order to contribute more fully to the contemporary arguments 
over nature and grace.  
Accordingly, the final chapter of this thesis will review contemporary revisionist accounts 
of Augustine on nature and grace in the light of De Natura et Gratia. It will be my contention 
that while Augustine conceives of the salvific grace of Jesus Christ as coming extra nos, this 
grace is never extraneous to our nature, to who we were created to be. In employing the term 
extra nos I do not intend to invoke the contrast between forensic justification and infused grace, 
but rather to represent how grace, for Augustine, is never inherent to our nature. Even though 
both nature and grace are the gifts of God, they are different gifts. However, the surprise of grace 
to our nature does not then render grace unneeded or extraneous to our nature. This is why 
Augustine could summarize De Natura et Gratia as a work in which he “did not defend grace in 
opposition to nature, but the grace by which nature is set free and ruled.”13 
Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace 
Henri de Lubac was born in 1896 to an aristocratic family living in Cambrai, near the 
Belgian border. His family soon returned to the south of France, and de Lubac entered the French 
Society of Jesus in 1913 in Lyon while still a teenager. The turbulence of the times would 
significantly impact upon de Lubac’s early years and it would be fourteen years before he was 
                                                 
 
12 Reinhard Hütter, “Desiderium Naturale Visionis Dei—Est Autem Duplex Hominis Beatitudo Sive 
Felicitas: Some Observations about Lawrence Feingold’s and John Milbank’s Recent Interventions in the Debate 
over the Natural Desire to See God,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition 5, no. 1 (2007): 91. 
13 Augustine, Retr., 2.68.42. 
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ordained. Indeed, turbulence seemed always to follow de Lubac, despite his renowned patrician 
temperament. Shortly after ordination, de Lubac took up a teaching post at the Catholic 
University of Lyon where he was to remain for over thirty years, albeit with significant 
interruptions both due to the Second World War and to his eventual censure and suspension from 
teaching by the Jesuit order. His first book, Catholicisme of 1938, presented the Catholic faith as 
one dealing uniquely in paradox, eschewing those approaches which considered theological 
controversies to be simple zero-sum games, lingering only in anticipation of being fully resolved 
one way or the other. Of all the paradoxes in the Christian faith, the greatest of them all was that, 
in Fergus Kerr’s words, “while the vision of God enjoyed by the blessed is a free gift, 
unanticipated, unmerited, never owed to them, yet the desire for it is, naturally and 
constitutively, in every human soul.”14 Catholicisme thus anticipated de Lubac’s engagement 
with the relationship of nature to grace. But it was in his 1946 Surnaturel that de Lubac most 
directly and, as it was to turn out, controversially addressed the issue. 
Kerr has written that the publication of Surnaturel “gave rise to the most acrimonious 
controversy in twentieth-century Catholic theology.”15 He describes the issue thus:  
Since the sixteenth century…, allowing themselves to be shaped by opposition to 
Lutheranism, Catholic theologians made so much of the distinction between nature 
and grace that they lost all sense of the ‘finality’ of nature for grace—of the way in 
which the human and the natural has always already been embraced within the 
supernatural.16  
This fear of a Lutheran, and perhaps Jansenist, dependence on the external Word and dominical 
grace had led neo-Scholastics to develop a theology of natura pura. Taking Thomas Aquinas as 
                                                 
 
14 Fergus Kerr, “Henri de Lubac,” ed. Svein Rise and Staale Johannes Kristiansen, Key Theological Thinkers: 
From Modern to Postmodern (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 202–3. 
15 Kerr, “Henri de Lubac,” 204. 
16 Kerr, “Henri de Lubac,” 204. 
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their guide, neo-Scholastic theologians had come to argue that the purely natural ends of man 
could be defined without reference to supernatural grace. But in Surnaturel de Lubac unmasked 
natura pura as a recent, novel, invention, owing more to modernism than to Thomas, much less 
Augustine. De Lubac employed Augustine, as well as a revisionist reading of Thomas, to argue 
for the gratuity of nature and its ordering towards grace against the defining of two different 
ends—one natural, the other supernatural—of man. The task with Thomas was perhaps the 
greater and more controversial given neo-Scholasticism’s dependence on him, and the testimony 
of the doctor himself who had declared that “man’s happiness is twofold... One is proportionate 
to human nature... The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature.”17 
The timing of Surnaturel was not accidental. In France, Marshal Pétain's Vichy regime had 
ruled from 1940–45, cooperating with Nazi Germany, and collaborating with Jewish 
deportations. The Catholic Church had largely fallen into line, giving its support to Pétain, so 
much so that the Catholic Church of France issued an official apology in 1997. While de Lubac 
had been developing the thesis of Surnaturel since his student days, it was mainly written during 
the war, with Vichy France providing an urgent context to his argument. The disastrous support 
for fascism among the French public and ecclesial authorities was, for de Lubac, a result of this 
novel theological divorce between nature and grace. The realm of nature was given an autonomy 
which isolated it from the influence of the gospel. The supernatural end of man was the church’s 
business, while the natural end of man was the state’s to affect as it pleased.18  
De Lubac was quickly accused of advocating a Nouvelle Theologie and in 1950, under 
                                                 
 
17 Cited by Hütter, “Desiderium Naturale,” 81. 
18 Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 88–89. 
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pressure from Rome, he was directed by the General of the Jesuits to cease teaching. De Lubac’s 
works were removed from libraries, and in the same year Pope Pius XII’s encyclical Humani 
Generis was promulgated with what was a widely considered to be a rebuke of de Lubac’s 
thesis.19 Pius XII defended the ability of human reason, “suis naturalibus viribus,” to attain “to a 
true and certain knowledge of the one personal God.” He openly criticized those “presumptive 
enough” to question the neo-Scholastic theological methodology that had flourished in recent 
years. These people posed a serious danger because their approach was “concealed beneath the 
mask of virtue.” These unnamed theologians seek to “destroy the gratuity of the supernatural 
order, since God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to 
the beatific vision.”20 While most people continue to read this encyclical as directed, in part, 
against de Lubac, it is worth noting that de Lubac himself, along with some other supporters, 
denied that it was directed against him.21 The stripping of his teaching faculties, under Roman 
influence, seems nevertheless to support the majority view. 
After a period of intellectual and ecclesial exile, de Lubac’s star began to rise in the lead up 
to the Second Vatican Council which he subsequently attended as a peritus and on which he 
exerted no small influence. It is generally considered that it was de Lubac's rehabilitated work 
which contributed to the council's pastoral constitution on the church in the world, Gaudium et 
Spes, and its explication of the single, and not double, vocation of man.22 The young, future 
popes Karol Wojtyła and Joseph Ratzinger both considered de Lubac to be at the forefront of a 
                                                 
 
19 See, for instance, Wisse, “The First Modern Person?,” 110–11. 
20 Pius XII, Humani Generis, 2; 10–13; 26.  
21 See Hütter, “Desiderium Naturale,” 86. 
22 Gaudium et Spes, 22. 
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renewal of Catholic theology which allowed de Lubac to publish more freely in his advanced 
years. Still, his work remained controversial, and his appointment to the house of cardinals by 
John Paul II only came about in 1983, when he was 87 years old. 
There is significant evidence to suggest that as time went on, de Lubac became more 
circumspect about his original treatment of nature and grace. In his earlier years, he seems to 
have reacted strongly to figures like Suarez who had used Augustine to argue that grace is a gift 
which is superadded to nature.23 For de Lubac, this was in direct contradiction to the 
Augustinian, “Fecisti nos ad Te,” on which many of his works can be considered a sort of 
commentary.24 All people were made “for Christ” (Col. 1:16) and it seemed not only incorrect 
but dangerous to claim that our creation can be understood in any way outside of our purpose. 
The young de Lubac would thus write to his friend Maurice Blondel in 1932 that the problem 
with any theology of natura pura was, “how can a conscious spirit be anything other than an 
absolute desire for God?”25  
The Henri de Lubac that emerges following the reinstatement of his teaching authority is in 
continuity with the de Lubac of Surnaturel, and yet there is a greater circumspection about his 
teaching on nature and grace. John Milbank, who, as we shall see, tends towards a more extreme 
elision of nature and grace, considers the mature de Lubac to be tiptoeing around the matter in an 
effort to appease the church authorities.26 But de Lubac’s mature thought is too cogent to give 
                                                 
 
23 See Eugene TeSelle, “Grace,” ed. Karla Pollmann and Otten Willemien, The Oxford Guide to the 
Historical Reception of Augustine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1069. 
24 Rudolf Voderholzer, “Henri De Lubac,” ed. Karla Pollmann and Otten Willemien, trans. David Gascoigne, 
The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1332. 
25 Cited by John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the 
Supernatural (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), viii. 
26 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 8. See also p. 104 where Milbank refers to de Lubac’s “formal 
capitulation to papal authority.” 
 11 
 
full credence to Milbank’s view. This thought is expressed essentially in two works both 
published in 1965: Augustinisme et Théologie Moderne, and then a work entitled Le Mystère du 
Surnaturel. Both of these books reworked material of Surnaturel suggesting a softening of his 
1946 bombshell. 
In these works, de Lubac does not revoke his earlier criticisms of neo-Scholasticism. But 
he does show a greater sensitivity to the dangers of the opposite pole, the Augustinianism of 
Baius and Jansenius. Their misguided attempt to stress the telos of nature in grace had led them 
to treat grace as if it was owed by God to our human nature on account of the creative act.27 For 
de Lubac, this was a fatal attempt to resolve the “fundamental paradox” of man’s relationship to 
God which is characterized on the one hand by a natural longing for fulfillment in God; but on 
the other hand by a reception of this fulfillment not as a matter of justice or inevitability but as an 
act of sheer and unexpected grace, a tension which Augustine had understood well.28 The de 
Lubac of 1965 could articulate a greater awareness of the dangers of resolving this tension in 
either direction, recognizing that a metaphysic of complete union would confuse what needed to 
be distinguished. And so he could write that between the Christian soul and God, “there is 
always a union, not absorption (whether in one sense or the other). It is, if you wish, a unification 
and not an identification. It involves mutual love even though all the initiative comes from 
God.”29  
In the light of what is to come in this study, it is worth quoting de Lubac a little more in 
                                                 
 
27 Henri de Lubac, Augustinianism and Modern Theology, trans. Lancelot Sheppard (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1969), 37–38. 
28 Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Herder, 1967), 21. 
29 From de Lubac’s 1965 essay “Mysticism and Mystery,” cited by Adam G. Cooper, Naturally Human, 
Supernaturally God: Deification in Pre-Conciliar Catholicism (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2014), 158. 
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this regard, here on the dangers of a Platonic identification of nature with grace. 
One must... be careful to correct—if not wholly to avoid—the neo-Platonist 
metaphors of flux, of gushing, of ‘effluence’, of emanation, of soaking into things. 
God is not, as one might think from some Platonist expressions also taken up by 
Denys, a generosity pouring himself out; it is at best inadequate to see him simply as 
that ‘fundamental generosity’ which must mean, for the Absolute, simply the fact of 
being essentially communicable; or that kind of generosity which is no more than a 
de-sacralized charity. Those who, in order to avoid ‘contingentist theories’ which 
might tend to anthropomorphism, accept rather too readily Platonist or Plotinian 
theories as if despairing in advance of purifying any personalist theory by the laws of 
analogy, are in danger of steering from Charybdis on to Scylla. No theory will 
dispense with the need for correction by analogy.30 
Just as Augustine’s “Fecisti nos ad Te”—which de Lubac invoked at the beginning of 
Augustinianism and Modern Theology—provided a check against treating grace as a mere 
superaddition to nature, so too de Lubac looked to Augustine for assistance in preventing the full 
elision of nature with grace. As he wrote in The Mystery of the Supernatural, citing Jacques 
Maritain: 
Despite all that has been said to the contrary, we must certainly maintain that ‘St 
Augustine taught as clearly as possible the ontological value of the distinction 
between nature and grace’; ‘he clearly affirmed that distinction even for the state of 
innocence’. The definitely and intrinsically supernatural character of divine adoption 
is one of the fundamental elements in his teaching; it is expressed there so clearly, 
and so insistently, that we should be astonished to find that it has not always been 
recognized.31 
De Lubac is often remembered for his concern that the idea of natura pura led to a 
misconception of man and a severing of grace from the supposedly privatized natural world.32 
But he ought equally to be read for this wariness of those who fail to properly distinguish 
between nature and grace. Hans Boersma rightly notes that “we need to take seriously these anti-
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Platonic comments... [De Lubac’s] desire to safeguard both the concrete character of the love of 
the triune God and his freedom in creating and redeeming was unambiguous.”33 Indeed, de 
Lubac could, in 1965, even express openness to the idea of natura pura provided it was 
employed to safeguard the gratuity of grace.34 
Radical Orthodoxy 
Henri de Lubac’s influence has experienced a resurgence in recent years. Theologians 
engaging with postmodern thought have found in de Lubac an ally against modernism and 
dualism, especially in his criticism of the theology of natura pura and of the separation of nature 
and grace as drastically different realities. The Radical Orthodoxy movement has, in particular, 
been drawn to de Lubac as anticipating their own anti-modernist concerns.  
The founding text of Radical Orthodoxy, John Milbank’s 1990 Theology and Social 
Theory, famously begins with the statement: “Once, there was no ‘secular’.”35 Milbank then goes 
on to explicate the thesis at the heart of Radical Orthodoxy, namely that the purely secular is a 
fiction when it is understood as some sort of neutral space in which religious forces have no 
hold. Just as the theologians of Radical Orthodoxy have sought to refute the idea of the purely 
secular over and against the sacred in the political sphere, so too in the realm of anthropology 
they have sought to reject the idea of the purely natural, denying that man can in any meaningful 
way be understood, or even exist, without reference to grace. The context of the movement is 
instructive here, arising as it has at a time not just of decline but fall for European churches. 
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What once stood at the heart of the lives of all Europeans has been cleared away to make room 
for a purportedly rational, neutral public square. Just as importantly for Radical Orthodoxy, 
given its intensely academic focus, it has arisen at a time when theology is given little attention 
outside its own circles, and when theology departments at universities are at best consigned to 
the margins of public discourse. It does not require much skill to detect a level of accordant 
frustration and stridency, particularly in Milbank’s tone, whom Reinhard Hütter has complained 
is often callously dismissive of opponents.36 
The influences of Radical Orthodoxy are diverse. Perhaps its key inheritance is the 
metaphysical achievement of Thomas and the analogia entis in contrast to the univocity of being 
most prominently espoused by Duns Scotus and, later, Suarez. According to Radical Orthodoxy, 
this Scotist, flattened ontology has tended to win the day in modernity, leaving no room for 
participation in the transcendent. Instead, we have been left with a kind of self-sufficient 
immanence, only related to God as like an Aristotelian accident. Radical Orthodoxy theologians 
sometimes describe this mistaken metaphysic as a two-storeyed universe with the realms of 
nature and grace, or Creator and creation, existing independently of each other. Their 
relationship is not one of mutual participation, but ultimately one of competition. To change the 
metaphor slightly, it is as if modernity conceived of God and creatures as beings on the same 
plane, whereby ceding authority to one would challenge the authority of the other. One of the 
more important texts for our thesis, about which we will have more to say shortly, is John 
Milbank’s 2005 The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the 
Supernatural. In an illustrative passage there, Milbank explains the kind of irresolvable problem 
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that this competitive, Scotist ontology leaves us with: “namely, how does the pure nature receive 
the gift—of its own volition or by the gift as standing over against its natural ungivenness? The 
first solution is Pelagian; the second, in Lutheran fashion, sees grace as overriding our 
freedom.”37 Putting to one side Milbank’s mischaracterization of Lutheran theology, Milbank’s 
point is that if nature and grace meet on this competitive plane, nature’s victory would be 
Pelagian and grace’s victory would be “Lutheran”—whereby grace is “no more a gift than is a 
brick wall we might inadvertently run into.”38 But in the Radical Orthodoxy invocation of 
Aquinas’ analogia entis, both of these approaches get it wrong because they begin with a false, 
Manichaean-like separation of God from creation, of grace from natura pura.39 Put in other 
words, how can we meaningfully talk of God giving a gift to an entity without understanding that 
the entity itself is a gift of God? This is why Milbank can say that, 
[T]he divine gift ... is a gift to no-one, but rather establishes creatures as themselves 
gifts, the divine gift passes across no neutral abyss, no interval of uncertainty during 
which one waits, with bated breath, to see if the destiny of a gift will be realised.40 
Thus this separation is not only false, but ultimately nonsensical. For any attempt to define man 
without reference to the giftedness of his very being, nor his divine telos, ends up doing violence 
to reason. Milbank put it this way in his 1999 contribution to the collection of essays entitled 
Radical Orthodoxy: 
[I]f the truth of nature lies in its supernatural ordination, then reason is true only to 
the degree that it seeks or prophesies the theoretical and practical acknowledgement 
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of this ordination which, thanks to the fall, is made possible again only through divine 
incarnation.41 
Theology which neglects this ordination of nature thus even ends up being “nihilistic” because it 
denies the ordered-ness of the cosmos according to God’s creative gift.42 
But beyond Aquinas and his warring children stands Augustine as a pre-eminent influence 
for the movement which, as we have noted, was originally called ‘Postmodern Critical 
Augustinianism.’ Milbank finds in Augustine a necessary rejection of the competitive plane, 
providing instead a “Christian infinitization of the absolute.” This in turn provides a “Christian 
theological ontology” in which all of nature and creation exists solely by God’s sustaining grace 
and has no meaning or even existence in itself. In Augustine then, theology can learn again to 
relinquish things like “notions of presence, of substance, the priority of idea over copy and cause 
over effect, of a subject with a rational essence, and of Being as ‘mirrored’ by this rational 
essence” and instead to insist on others such as “transcendence, participation, analogy, hierarchy, 
teleology.”43 All of these terms become laden with a specific meaning in Radical Orthodoxy, but 
Milbank expressed the animating idea in his fifteenth thesis of his programmatic 1991 essay:  
One way to try to secure peace is to draw boundaries around ‘the same’, and to 
exclude ‘the other’; to promote some practices and disallow alternatives. Most 
polities, and most religions, characteristically do this. But the Church has 
misunderstood itself when it does likewise ... Christianity should not draw 
boundaries.44 
While now is not the time to explore the problems that Milbank opens himself up to, passages 
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like this hardly make it surprising that he has been charged with panentheism.45 
The Suspended Middle 
Milbank directly engages the theology of de Lubac on nature and grace in The Suspended 
Middle, to which we shall now turn. He sees himself as appreciatively appropriating de Lubac 
while also extending his thought to those places where he was pointing, but which he did not 
necessarily explicate. But, crucially, this depends upon reading de Lubac’s mature thought as 
compromised by “concessions to the Church hierarchy” following Humani Generis, and not as 
the authentic concerns of one grown more circumspect to his earlier reactions against natura 
pura.46 This interpretation allows Milbank to build on the early de Lubac’s critique of the 
dualistic divide of nature and grace without incorporating his later checks.  
When Milbank thus looks at de Lubac’s stress on the paradoxical nature of man’s 
relationship to God, his reading begins to look more panentheist than de Lubac: 
For de Lubac, the enigma ran equally in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the 
extra-ordinary, the supernatural, which is always manifest within the Creation, is 
present at the heart of the ordinary: it is “precisely the real”—or “the real in its 
precision”—as [film director Robert] Bresson put it. On the other hand, the ordinary 
and given always at its heart points beyond itself and in its spiritual nature aspires 
upwards to the highest. Grace is always kenotic; the natural is always elevated but not 
destroyed. Yet by a symmetrical paradox the ‘more’ that is demanded by nature can 
only be received from God as a gift.47 
Milbank’s use of the word “always” here brings a totalizing quality not as obviously present in 
de Lubac. It should be remembered here that de Lubac did not consider Humani Generis—which 
had denounced those who say, in a rather totalizing fashion, that God “cannot create intellectual 
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47 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 5–6. 
 18 
 
beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision”—to be directed against his work. 
De Lubac’s later work suggests that he wanted to clarify why he felt Humani Generis did not 
directly address his thought. But Milbank interprets Humani Generis to be accurately 
summarizing and criticizing de Lubac, albeit while being completely wrong in its judgment. 
This reading requires Milbank to read the 1965 treatises of de Lubac as being unduly 
written “in deference to Humani Generis.”48 And so Milbank takes his departure from de Lubac, 
when de Lubac says in The Mystery of the Supernatural that the longing of the soul is “born of a 
lack” and does not involve any participation in God, “even initially or distantly.”49 Milbank’s 
participationist ontology leads him to read around de Lubac here. So too when de Lubac claims 
that while man is left after the fall still with the imago Dei, he nevertheless is lacking the 
participation in God that only grace can give. For Milbank, de Lubac is here departing from 
Augustine, whom Milbank invokes to support his participationist ontology: “For Augustine 
himself, by contrast [to de Lubac], the imago Dei that always remains involves some degree of 
participation in the Godhead, if not the participation of grace, and it is destined to rise, by grace, 
into a similitudo of God.”50 Indeed, for Milbank, Augustine is the model theologian when it 
comes to refusing any place to notions like natura pura.51 But because de Lubac was “seeking to 
square his views with Humani Generis,” de Lubac missed the opportunity to develop his 
theology in a participationist direction, and instead “reduces the natural desire for the 
supernatural to a negative lack and denies that it in any way positively anticipates the 
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supernatural end.”52 And so Milbank takes the opportunity to fill what was lacking, so to speak, 
in de Lubac: 
Cosmos requires the government of spirit; spirit is destined to be engraced; therefore 
in one sense every creature is already for and by grace. After all, how could charis be 
a less original or plenitudinous gift than esse?53 
Milbank takes de Lubac away from a salvific focus, to a kind of cosmological, neo-Platonist 
perspective—the very perspective that de Lubac himself had warned against. As Milbank puts it 
in another work, “Christological and atonement doctrines... [are] theoretically secondary to 
definitions of the character of the new universal community or Church.”54  
 In this complex but important conversation Augustine is thus controversially enlisted to 
help re-Platonize theology and to supersede the centrality of Christ Jesus as mediator between 
God and man. In seeking to move beyond the univocity of being, Milbank sees the only options 
for modern theology as either going the way of the French, who tend to supernaturalize the 
natural, or the way of the Germans, who tend to naturalize the supernatural.55 There are no other 
options for Milbank, because every other option imposes a boundary. And in that choice, 
Milbank sides with the “French.”  
Augustine and Modernity 
Michael Hanby, a former student of Milbank, has written the most systematic treatment of 
Augustine from a Radical Orthodoxy perspective. While Milbank tends to deal in allusions to 
Augustine and Augustinianism that can be difficult to assess, Hanby provides a reading of 
                                                 
 
52 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 66. 
53 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 100. 
54 John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1997), 
148. 
55 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 207. 
 20 
 
Augustine that can more readily be evaluated. Nevertheless, Hanby can tend towards the opaque. 
At the beginning of his 2003 Augustine and Modernity—a title which echoes de Lubac’s 
Augustinianism and Modern Theology—he anticipates a number of criticisms people may have 
of his work: 
There is something here to dissatisfy nearly everyone. Theologians will likely think 
this book too philosophical; philosophers will likely think the reverse. Historians may 
well complain that it is insufficiently historical and all might find it insufficiently 
exegetical.56 
This lack of a “historical” and “exegetical” treatment of Augustine can indeed be problematic. In 
a critique of Hanby’s book which we shall look at later on, Maarten Wisse stated: “Not only does 
Hanby not practice historical and exegetical analysis, he would not even be able to do it, as it 
contradicts Radical Orthodoxy’s ontology.”57 In response, Hanby suggested that Wisse was 
missing the point, as Augustine and Modernity sought not to deny the importance of historical 
and exegetical analysis, but rather to ask whether contemporary Augustinian studies held to 
ontological presuppositions which prevented it from adequate historical analyses.58 In some 
ways, the thrust of this present thesis is to hold up Radical Orthodoxy’s Augustine to the 
exegetical light which it is at risk of ignoring.  
But that is not to say that Hanby’s work is evasive. His goal in Augustine and Modernity is 
to show that the two are not friends, and that Augustine actually provides us with a critique of 
modernity, Radical Orthodoxy-style.59 This stands at odds with a good deal of Augustinian 
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interpretation in the last two centuries. The case for Augustine as the first modern man has been 
made by thinkers as diverse as Adolf von Harnack and Charles Taylor. The former tended to 
celebrate this thesis, while Taylor has recently lamented it—that Augustine’s focus on the 
interior self inaugurated a transition to a modern, subjective self which Descartes later 
explicated. For Taylor, “Augustine shifts the focus from the field of objects known to the activity 
itself of knowing; God is to be found here.”60 The Yale theologian Robert Calhoun was another 
who presented a proto-Cartesian Augustine, in a relatively even-handed fashion: 
In several works, early and late, Augustine offers the self as a first instance of what 
can be certainly known. If I find myself able to raise questions as the skeptics do 
about the possibility of having knowledge of objective reality, I find that in raising 
the question I am tacitly affirming my own existence as the questioner, the doubter… 
Si fallor sum [If I am deceived, I am]—he put it into a little aphorism.61 
One major contemporary critic of this Augustine, whom Hanby raises as an interlocutor, is Eric 
Alliez. Alliez, in a rather bold fashion, sees this Augustinian definition of the self without 
reference to God as ultimately pointing towards nihilism. In Hanby’s paraphrase of Alliez’s 
position, “the Christian and particularly Augustinian conception of the relationship between 
Creator and creature actually produces its mirror opposite and subordinates the Creator, and 
everything else, to the creature.”62 To quote Alliez directly, 
[T]he divine economy henceforth implies a principle of dissociation, a specific break 
between what is beyond and what is here below, which, far from fulfilling itself in a 
negative logic with regard to the terrestrial city, in the end favors the autonomy of the 
temporal.63 
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When all theological reflection is filtered through the self, as Augustine is charged with 
advocating, then all theology, and God himself, is subordinated to the self. From here it is a short 
step to the modernist form of atheism in which the self is the only certain thing in a world of 
doubt. Hanby refers to this as a “Niebuhrian” economy of separation which, as we have seen 
with Milbank, is a bête noir of Radical Orthodoxy, and crucially important for all discussions of 
the relationship between nature and grace.  
Hanby comes to the defense of Augustine by arguing that far from envisioning an economy 
of separation, Augustine established an “economy of beauty” in which all things are made 
intelligible together, in the one economy, and not in separate orders. In this regard, Hanby 
praises Taylor for intuiting this direction in Augustine: “Taylor rightly notes that Augustinian 
interiority, constituted in a relationship to God more intimately related to the self than itself, is in 
a sense radically exterior.”64 But while Taylor does not develop this further, Hanby sees this 
exteriority as a key to establishing Augustine as anti-modern. According to Hanby, Augustine 
envisioned a kind of subjectivity which was fundamentally ordered towards objectivity. This can 
be seen in the Confessions where Augustine declares that God is “interior intimo meo”—“more 
inward than my most inward part”, or “closer to me than myself.”65 Augustine’s introspection 
thus actually moves him not to the knowledge of his self, but to the love and knowledge of God, 
encompassing a paradox whereby subjectivity leads to objectivity and indeed is necessary for 
objectivity, as it is only through self-knowledge that one can be led outward to the true 
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knowledge of God.66 This cannot, however, be understood to mean that Augustine advocated a 
panentheistic, God-within, glorification of nature. As obvious a point as that may seem to be, it 
has eluded Charles T. Mathewes who writes concerning Augustine’s interior intimo meo:  
The human fault lies in attempting to deny our nature; to be fully (and properly) 
natural beings would be to return to a state of grace. Like the knowing subject, the 
acting subject finds its place in the world and before God because it finds the world 
and God at its heart.67 
Such a perspective actually falls into the very danger that Alliez warned about, whereby God is 
subjected to the self on a pious-sounding road to nihilism. 
Hanby’s reading of Augustinian exteriority has recently been supported by the work of the 
Notre Dame Augustinian scholar John Cavadini. Cavadini has persuasively shown that for all the 
modern talk of Augustine and the self, there is no equivalent in Latin for the English word “self.” 
While Augustine does refer to things like the interior homo, the common translation “inner self” 
suggests a non-sensory interior place instead of a full-blooded and full-bodied man.68 The effect 
of translations like these is to suggest a stable, independent subject which can be defined without 
reference to God. Cavadini rightly suggests something very different is going on in Augustine: 
In fact, the closer one examines the imagery which Augustine uses to express the 
content of self-awareness, the more one becomes convinced that he does not use it to 
describe a stable reality called “the self” that becomes more and more clearly visible 
the purer one’s interior vision becomes, but rather something that defies reification. 
The content of self-awareness, for those truly self-aware, is much more disturbing 
and mysterious, more exciting and hopeful, more treacherous and full of risk.69 
Indeed if there could possibly be something like “the self” in Augustine, it would actually best 
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denote the prideful soul which vainly attempts to assert its independence from God.70 In a similar 
fashion, Rowan Williams writes of Augustine's anthropology in the Confessions: “The 
abandonment shown in humility, falling down upon the prostrate Christ, the dead Christ, is of a 
piece with the abandonment that is central to the whole enterprise of the Confessions, that is, the 
repudiation of the ‘finished’ self.”71 While Cavadini’s study came out some years after Augustine 
and Modernity, it is nevertheless anticipated by Hanby who sees that the Cartesian genealogy 
actually stretches back to the Stoics, who also influenced Pelagius. For Hanby, then, the Pelagian 
controversy can yield important fruit, because it embodies the clash between a proto-Cartesian, 
Pelagian economy of separation and an Augustinian economy of participation, providing a way 
to clarify the relationship between nature and grace. 
Hanby writes that despite its prominence in the Christian theological tradition, it is not 
immediately clear “just why the Pelagian controversy was controversial. … [B]oth ancient and 
modern readers alike have tended to abstract Augustine's doctrine of grace from its intellectual 
and ontological context to treat it merely as a function of the anti-Pelagian polemics.”72 We here 
can see a part of Hanby’s rationale for not being sufficiently “exegetical.” Concern merely with 
the polemics of controversy can, according to Hanby, obscure the deeper ontological issues at 
play. And so Hanby is critical of the approach of J. Patout Burns, one of the more thorough 
scholars of Augustine’s doctrine of grace. In a critique that bears witness to wider trends in 
Augustinian studies, Hanby criticizes Burns’ “genetic” approach for not addressing what is latent 
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in Augustine’s mind, favouring simply “textual output,” and even then failing to consider the 
non-Pelagian texts.73 This somewhat needless attack is representative of a similarly needless 
divide in contemporary Augustine scholarship which this thesis hopes to overcome. Some of the 
most compelling, recent studies of Augustine have abandoned the methodology of close reading 
in favour of attending to the Augustinian vision in a broader sense.74 To take one of the more 
striking examples, the most recent biography of Augustine, which Rowan Williams has said is 
“capable of doing for a new generation a great deal of what Peter Brown's epochal biography did 
half a century ago,”75 is Miles Hollingworth’s Saint Augustine of Hippo: An Intellectual 
Biography. For all of Hollingworth’s ingenuity and insight, he is more focussed on his own 
subjective meditations on the sweep of Augustinian thought in dialogue with the history of 
philosophy and theology than he is with an exegetical, chronological approach to his subject. 
Thus worthy and even exciting new treatments of Augustine, such as Hanby’s, are played off 
against the previous generation’s careful and deliberate scholarship, such as Burns’. And while 
the breadth of vision of this new trend is fascinating and perhaps does reveal the lower horizons 
of some Augustinian scholarship, the need to attend to the text of Augustine cannot be surpassed. 
The structure of this thesis is an attempt to bring these two types of Augustinian studies into 
conversation with one another.  
Nevertheless, Hanby tends to pit the polemical and historical context against his own 
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ontological context. To correct this tendency towards the former among Augustinian scholarship, 
Hanby singles out Augustine’s De Trinitate as crucial for discerning Augustine’s ontological 
vision. 
The failure of much of modern scholarship to avail itself of this text is indicative of 
its failure to come to grips with the ontological stakes of the question—a fact which 
suggests in turn a great ontological distance between most contemporary scholars and 
Augustine.76 
His reading of De Trinitate leads Hanby to a participatory ontology which he sees as providing a 
way past the debates among scholars around the question “whether grace or nature.” According 
to this zero-sum game, to emphasize nature is Pelagian, while to emphasize grace in an 
Augustinian fashion is to diminish what is natural and human. As an example, Hanby quotes 
disapprovingly Rebecca Harden Weaver. “The subordination of the human will and action to 
grace calls into question the degree to which human actions are genuinely human.”77 But this is 
to make a fundamental error, attempting to understand the Pelagian controversy within an 
economy of separation. Any ontological vision which conceives of natura pura and extrinsic 
grace as separate realities has already, according to Hanby, ceded the victory to Pelagianism, no 
matter which reality comes out on top. Simply to conceive of a human nature somehow “outside” 
of the Triune God is to be already Pelagian. Despite his occasionally dismissive tone (albeit 
nothing compared to Milbank) this is a significant and provocative thesis, because it leads Hanby 
to conclude that much of what has been concluded among scholars as the Augustinian 
achievement in the Pelagian controversy—namely, the triumph of grace over nature—is “a form 
of Augustinianism which is actually Pelagian.”78 
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As Hanby has put it in a more recent chapter, Augustine in the Pelagian debate “is adamant 
against parceling out discrete divine and human contributions to the good human act.”79 The 
point of the Pelagian controversy was not, then, a triumph of grace over nature, but rather a: 
cosmological triumph. Implicitly it vindicated and instituted nature as the gratuitous 
creation of the transcendent God against the machinations of the pyr teknikon, the 
self-crafting fire of stoicism, for which any interaction between human and divine 
must be a “tensional” interchange between immanent forces.80 
And at the heart of this triumph stands the incarnation and the hypostatic union which has 
resulted in a reconfiguring of “cosmology as creation, creation as soteriology, soteriology as 
aesthetics and aesthetics as doxology.”81 Like much of the Radical Orthodoxy project, then, the 
incarnation is looked to as carrying salvific weight in its uniting of the natural and the 
supernatural in the one person Jesus Christ in whom salvation is fully revealed. The incarnation 
is a cosmological event which brings about the redemption of the whole natural order in the body 
of Christ. And so Hanby can say that Christ’s manifestation “already implies participation in 
Augustine.”82 Faith is given very little attention in Radical Orthodoxy, and Hanby points to the 
reasons why. “The distinction between manifestation and apprehension within Augustine's 
aesthetic soteriology is an artificial one.” Creation is reformed “within the unity of Christ's 
body.”83 The incarnation brought about an “aesthetic soteriology” whose ramifications are 
cosmological. Salvation is the restoration of the aesthetic order and harmony of creation manifest 
to us through “participation in the unity of Christ’s humanity and divinity” rather than a kind of 
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personal faith.84 The salvific body of Christ is then not so much a discreet entity to be 
apprehended by the autonomous believer, but rather the embodied restoration of creation.  
While it can be too simplistic to claim that some theologies emphasize the incarnation over 
the crucifixion, or vice versa, it is nevertheless inescapable that the incarnation in Radical 
Orthodoxy is of central focus. It facilitates a theology of the cosmological restoration of all 
creation in Christ. This is not to say that Hanby’s Augustine is a universalist. He writes that 
Augustine see that “all are members incorporate in the bodies of either of the two Adams, 
citizens of either of the two cities characterized by their respective objects of worship and subject 
to either of the two mediators.”85 But it is the hypostatic union, and not the blood of the crucified 
Christ, which is the most decisive event for the salvation of creation. For example, when Hanby 
refers to Augustine’s De Natura et Gratia—the treatise that will be at the heart of our next 
chapter—and his concern that nature construed in Pelagian terms “renders the cross of Christ 
void,” Hanby expands this to say that nullifying the cross “will somehow nullify creation's 
participation in the divine love and, conversely, that a rupture in participation will rupture 
Christ's mediation.” He goes on: “Indeed it is not too strong to say, with proper qualifications, 
that soteriology is for Augustine simply the fulfillment and intensification of creation.”86 
Thus Hanby can refer to “Augustine's elision of creation and sanctification into a single 
economy” and can seek to understand not just gratia but also natura in a Christological way, 
affirming St Paul’s proclamation that “all things were created through him [Christ] and for 
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him.”87 Nature is not “ours”, not an autonomous self-enclosed res, but rather it is God’s in Christ 
Jesus. In support of this reading, Hanby appeals in part to de Lubac, although not in such a 
comprehensive way as Milbank. He notes how de Lubac provides historical support for this 
reading of the Pelagian controversy: 
Interestingly, in telling contrast to the Protestant attempt to recruit anti-Pelagian 
Augustine to underscore the difference between nature and grace, de Lubac cites a 
tradition of criticism of pre-Thomist Augustinianism, dating back to Albert Magnus, 
alleging Augustine's failure to distinguish significantly between nature and grace, the 
very division he is often thought to have instituted.88 
But like Milbank, he sees his project as furthering what de Lubac had pointed to but not 
developed. “Even Henri de Lubac, who recognized so clearly that Pelagianism is really about the 
natural and its supernatural consummation, does not sufficiently elaborate this point.”89 While 
Milbank’s The Suspended Middle was written two years after Augustine and Modernity, Hanby 
offers a reading of de Lubac consistent with his teacher Milbank’s preferencing of the earlier de 
Lubac and seeing the later de Lubac as kowtowing to the authorities. 
Whether Hanby focusses on ontological issues to illuminate Augustine or despite him is the 
important question here. Radical Orthodoxy tends to see ontological issues as lying behind all 
controversies and errors, and Hanby is no exception. Maarten Wisse, whose criticisms of Hanby 
we shall attend to later, has summarized Radical Orthodoxy’s approach: 
The target of Radical Orthodoxy's reception of Augustine is what they call Western 
nihilism, the idea of a technological world of self-constituting objects with no uniting 
vision, no dependence on God, and the Cartesian subject as the master of the 
universe. The Augustine received in an attempt to overcome this nihilism is a rather 
Platonic Augustine, in which the world is united in its ontological participation in 
God. Everything that is, is ‘gift’, taking up Augustine’s admission of this title of the 
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Holy Spirit (Hanby). Likewise, Augustine's order of love, which in Radical 
Orthodoxy takes the shape of an erotic desire for the other, plays a major role, as it 
marks all reality as a mutual giving rather than self-subsistence (Milbank).90 
Was the Pelagian controversy essentially a clash of metaphysics? While we are postponing 
analysis to the final chapter, Sigridur Gudmarsdottir is one reviewer who is wary of Hanby’s 
dependence on De Trinitate as a lens through which to read everything else. “I suspect Hanby's 
method of synthesizing De Trinitate, and interpreting all other works of Augustine in the light of 
this synthesis, is an oversimplifying of the rich complexity of Augustine's thought.”91 Hanby’s 
can seem to be an unsatisfyingly myopic reading which looks past Augustine’s insistence upon 
the absolute ontological difference between God and the world. And yet, as we shall see, his 
further clarifications in a 2007 colloquium reveal Hanby to be a much more nuanced reader than 
Milbank and, in a similar way to de Lubac, keen to acknowledge that the distinction between 
nature and grace is essential to any cogent understanding of Augustine. This issue, along with 
that of the zero-sum game between nature and grace, the economy of participation, a 
cosmological rather than personal soteriological focus, and of the incarnation as decisive for 
salvation, will be a part of the mix as we look at Augustine himself. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AUGUSTINE’S DE NATURA ET GRATIA 
We now look to Augustine to assess his approach to nature and grace in light of the 
aforementioned discussion. That need not, and must not, require vainly and anachronistically 
attempting to read contemporary concerns back into Augustine. We will look at Augustine on his 
own terms, but nevertheless with an ear attuned to his discussion of the problems Henri de 
Lubac, and Radical Orthodoxy, have raised. The final chapter will then bring these voices 
together. 
The goal of this approach is to use De Natura et Gratia as a case study for reading and 
assessing Radical Orthodoxy’s Augustinianism and Michael Hanby’s approach to the Pelagian 
controversy in particular. As we have noted, Hanby has been critical of J. Patout Burns’ 
“genetic” approach to Augustine which focuses narrowly on Augustine’s “textual output” rather 
than on the broader systematic nature of his thought.1 Others, like Charles T. Mathewes, have 
made similar statements.2 While there is much to be said for attending to Augustine’s theological 
ontology, any Augustinianism worth its weight must deal with, and to some extent be measured 
by, the “textual output” in a comprehensive way. The 415 anti-Pelagian treatise De Natura et 
Gratia is, as Alfred Vanneste has said, “le premier de l'histoire de la théologie chrétienne à 
confronter de façon formelle et directe les notions de nature, et de grâce.”3 And as the first 
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treatment of this theological relationship, it remains important for all future considerations and 
definitions, especially for those claiming to be Augustinian. In this treatise, Augustine also dealt 
with many of the relevant aspects of the debate, including a particular focus on the inability of 
man to reach for salvation in Christ. Other early anti-Pelagian treatises such as De Spiritu et 
Littera and De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, while relevant, do not have the same 
importance for this study.4 So while we will have opportunity to refer to them, it is De Natura et 
Gratia, in response to Pelagius’ De Natura, that will be front and center in reading Augustine’s 
understanding of the relationship between nature and grace.  
Robert F. Evans has noted that it was De Natura et Gratia which marked the point at which 
the Pelagian controversy became a controversy.5 Previously, Augustine had dealt more 
considerately with Pelagius and while he still refrained from naming Pelagius in De Natura et 
Gratia (“for fear that he would be offended and become more difficult to heal”6), his 
denunciatory tone indicates a shift in intensity.7 Peter Brown has suggested that Augustine did 
not mention Pelagius by name in De Natura et Gratia out of a reticence to offend Pelagius’ 
influential patrons, however the desire to persuade Pelagius without turning him off seems more 
plausible.8 Not only did Augustine mention this as the cause in Letter 186, but also in a treatise 
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of the following year, De Gestis Pelagii. There he writes that he did not mention the author of De 
Natura by name, “judging that he would succeed better if, by safeguarding their friendship, he 
dealt tactfully with the honour of the man for whose writings he no longer had to have 
consideration.”9 This approach has further been confirmed by one of the Divjak letters, recently 
re-discovered. In Letter 19*, Augustine wrote to Jerome in 416 regarding Pelagius, “I would 
wish to correct him as a friend, something I still desire, I confess, and I do not doubt that your 
Holiness also wishes it.”10 But that does not qualify the seriousness of the matter for Augustine. 
According to Augustine in his Letter 186 to Paulinus of Nola, it was upon reading De Natura 
that he came to see that Pelagius’ teachings were “hostile and contrary to the grace of God.” In 
that letter Augustine also wrote that De Natura “tries to convince us of views that wipe out from 
the hearts of the faithful a belief in the grace of God that has been given to the human race 
through the one mediator between God and human beings, the man Jesus Christ.” Augustine 
continues, in words that are not irrelevant to the contemporary Augustinian accounts we have 
looked at: 
That book of his contains and asserts many times and amply the same thing that he 
also states in a certain letter sent to Your Reverence in which he says that he should 
not be thought to defend free choice without the grace of God, since he says that the 
ability to will and to act, without which we can neither will nor do anything good, 
was implanted in us by the creator. In that way Pelagius’ teaching would have us 
understand that the grace of God is something common to pagans and Christians, to 
the good and the bad, and to believers and unbelievers.11  
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This teaching would “empty of meaning the Lord’s coming,” and Augustine then quotes his 
version of Galatians 2:21: “If righteousness comes through nature, then Christ has died in 
vain.”12 Nature and grace are thus contrasted, showing how crucial De Natura et Gratia is in 
seeking to understand what it actually was in Pelagius to which Augustine objected. The 
importance of De Natura et Gratia, Augustine’s response to De Natura, is further evidenced by 
its being sent by the African bishops to Rome in 416 as part of a letter to the pope, Augustine’s 
sending it also to John of Jerusalem,13 and Augustine’s own consideration of it as being of 
importance to the whole debate.14 
One more word can be said on this approach. Augustine’s anti-Pelagian treatises tend to be 
dealt with together, as a whole. This has merit in tracking the progress of the debate, Augustine’s 
emerging thinking, and also giving attention to their polemical context. But there is also a place 
for the kind of close reading that some of Augustine’s other works attract. Studies of De Natura 
et Gratia only appear within broader studies of the Pelagian controversy, and no study of De 
Natura et Gratia has been done in the light of recent, revisionist readings of Augustine. 
The Context of De Natura et Gratia 
There are interesting parallels between the context of De Natura et Gratia and our 
contemporary context which has seen the issue of nature and grace rise again. While Augustine 
was writing following the dawning of Constantinianism, it was also at a time when the Roman 
Empire was coming to an end and when civic virtues were being eroded. Then, as now, 
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Christians were trying to overcome a naturalistic, humanist autonomy that sought to define the 
human without reference to God. This was not just in Stoic Rome but also in Christian North 
Africa. For Augustine’s flock, Christ was often the god for the next world, but this world was 
controlled by different means, including amulets, astrologers, soothsayers.15 And they were also, 
as now, dealing with a temptation to separate the domain of grace from contemporary political 
concerns. Consideration of some of the major contextual influences will then be essential for 
reading De Natura et Gratia and discussing its relevance for today. 
The Donatist Controversy 
The major controversies of Augustine’s life, against the Manichaeans, the Donatists, and 
the Pelagians, followed upon each other’s heels in a relatively orderly fashion. The controversy 
directly preceding the Pelagian debates was Augustine against the North African Donatists, 
which occupied him during the first decade of the fifth century. While there was not a lot of 
chronological overlap between the controversies, the thematic overlap is not irrelevant. 
The Donatist claim, it will be remembered, was that only the pure could celebrate the 
sacraments. All those Christians who had been compromised during persecutions had 
immediately disqualified themselves from valid celebrations of the sacraments, even if they had 
subsequently repented. The ongoing significance of the issue was ensured by the logic that all 
those priests and bishops who were ordained by a compromised bishop were thus themselves 
unable to validly celebrate the sacraments. Augustine, in his response to this rigor, did affirm the 
Donatist claim that only the pure could celebrate the sacraments, but asserted that it was God 
through Christ Jesus, who made his people pure, through the ministrations of flawed bishops. 
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Christ was our mediator in this regard and not the bishops.16 In Burns’ words, “Christ is the 
guarantor of the efficacy of the sacrament.”17 In ways that would anticipate his argument against 
the Pelagians, Augustine rejected a dependence on the adequacy of human nature. Purity, merit 
and validity were not generated from within but were bestowed, and continually bestowed at 
that. Just because a traditor had betrayed Christ and His church, did not mean that they could not 
later receive forgiveness for their sins. To suggest anything otherwise would deprive Christ of 
the position as sole savior, making his blood superfluous, as Augustine would proclaim 
repeatedly in the Pelagian controversy.18  
In an era of state persecution, the Donatists also stressed the complete otherness of 
Christian faith. They tended to look favorably upon Orthodox Jewish relations to the Torah as a 
law which set them apart from the rest of the world. In the Donatist version of the Acts of the 
martyrs, for instance, one would read things like: “I care for nothing but the law of God.”19 They 
had a strong sense of ritual separation and, it is interesting to note, they cherished episcopal 
succession as a visible instantiation of the Church’s purity and exclusivist community.20 If the 
church was a pure community, set apart from the world, then its members likewise had to be 
pure, or else forsake the Christian community for that of the world. Augustine, by contrast, partly 
under the influence of Neo-Platonic ways of thought, saw the world and the church more in a 
state of becoming, in which all things depended upon God through Christ Jesus. As Peter Brown 
has put it, “the rites of the church were undeniably “holy,” because of the objective holiness of a 
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church which “participated” in Christ.”21 In this way, Augustine could distinguish between the 
absolute holiness of Christ, and the participatory, derived, and “becoming” holiness of the 
members of the Christian church. While Burns perhaps makes Augustine sound too proto-
Lutheran by saying that “the saints are both sinners and free of sin,” nevertheless Augustine was 
under no illusion about the reality of sin in the Christian life and, in his own words, says that 
Christians “are both righteous and yet not without sin.”22 The church, then, is an ecclesia 
permixta, a mixed church without full perfection, but nevertheless participating in Christ’s 
holiness even while remaining sinners. In Robert Markus’ phrase, this anti-Donatist and 
subsequently anti-Pelagian theology of Augustine was a sustained “defense of Christian 
mediocrity,” a proclamation that the simple people of the church were still Christians. It was a 
theology forged, in part, through Augustine’s pastoral experiences as bishop of Hippo.23 
Burns has also shown the relevance of Augustine’s doctrine of justification in the Donatist 
controversy for his developing theology of grace. In his analysis of the development of 
Augustine’s view of operative grace, Burns distinguishes between “congruous vocation”—in 
which God affects his control over the human will by environmental means which work to 
persuade and change—and the kind of direct, inner intervention by which God changes wills.24 
Burns’ contention is that while Augustine came to believe in “congruous vocation” earlier, with 
his 396 Ad Simplicianum, the more direct functioning operative grace only appeared in 
Augustine from around 418 onwards. For Burns, then, Augustine’s advocacy of coercive force at 
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the end of the Donatist controversy was a significant development. His advocacy of coercion 
showed that persuasion and congruous vocation was no longer all that mattered. God can 
frighten in order to draw to Christ: 
The justification of coercion helped move Augustine to a notion of liberty which is 
the fruit of grace rather than its foundation, a freedom which is not the permanent and 
inalienable possession of human nature.25 
This will become of some significance in the Pelagian controversy. Freedom is not a given part 
of who we are, as Pelagius would argue, but rather the fruit of bestowed grace. The will, for 
Augustine, is no longer an even scale which God directs by providing external, persuasive 
weights which tend it to certain directions. Rather, it begins to look like a broken scale, tilted 
away from Christ and enslaved to sin, needing not just persuasion but even violence to bring it 
freedom.26 The inner influence of direct grace would appear later, too. Thus, Burns says, “the 
differences between Augustine’s early and later theories of nature and grace cannot simply be 
attributed to the challenge posed by the diametrically opposed doctrines of the Manichees and 
the Pelagians.”27 The contexts did change, but so did Augustine’s understanding. 
One of the ramifications of the Donatist controversy’s direct influence on Augustine’s anti-
Pelagian theology was that those parts of the church outside North Africa who had not 
experienced the Donatist controversy found it harder to understand the charges against Pelagius. 
Donatism had attuned Augustine and other Africans to the dangers of Pelagianism, but it was a 
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concern lost to other parts of the Christian world. As Burns writes: “The doctrine of nature and 
grace developed during the Pelagian controversy was easily assimilated only by the Africans, 
who shared Cyprian’s heritage and the struggle against the Donatists.”28 There is, then, a geo-
political context that must be considered. 
The Sack of Rome and the Genealogy of Controversy 
On August 24, 410 Alaric the Goth entered Rome with an army. Twice in the past two 
years the Goths had laid siege to Rome, crippling the city albeit without overtaking it 
completely. That was achieved in August 410 when the Goths finally sacked Rome and created 
innumerable Roman refugees across the empire. The Roman aristocracy had already begun 
emigrating en masse from 408 onwards as Alaric began laying siege to Rome. By 410 the 
emigration had exploded, and it was this direct impact which led Roman Pelagians to leave their 
own shores and begin to cause controversy in North Africa. But even more significantly, Peter 
Brown has suggested that the threat of the barbarian invasions may itself have helped to inspire 
Pelagius and his followers’ commitment to a kind of Stoic, old way of life.29 As he writes in his 
classic biography of Augustine, “no matter how self-consciously Christian the Pelagian 
movement had been, it rested firmly on a bed rock of the old ethical ideals of paganism, 
especially on Stoicism.”30  
Pelagius himself was born in Britain, but then travelled in the East, only returning to the 
West in order to settle in Rome around the year 400 when he would have been around fifty years 
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old. Henry Chadwick suggested that his travel east formed in Pelagius a more positive approach 
to nature which perhaps appealed to aristocratic Romans who were attracted to Christianity but 
also feared the loss of Stoic virtues.31 Indeed Pelagius’ first two works, De Natura and De Libero 
Arbitrio were both composed in the back-and-forth of a controversy with Jerome, with whom he 
may have had contact while travelling in the East, concerning the possibility of sinlessness as 
well as the state of marriage.32 Vanneste has described the former work, De Natura, as 
essentially “une tentative pour christianiser l'idée grecque—et surtout stoïcienne—de nature.”33 
Pelagius would have been shocked by the apparent licentiousness of the average Roman 
Christian, and instead appealed to a quasi-monastic spiritual practice which coincided with 
Roman Stoicism. And so Pelagius found himself something of a spiritual advisor to Rome’s 
Christian elite, and began to write commentaries on Paul’s letters from this Stoic-Christian 
theological perspective. It is possible, however, to assign too much responsibility to Pelagius. 
According to the contemporary Marius Mercator it was Rufinus of Syria who first sowed 
“Pelagian” seed in Rome by corrupting Pelagius. Bonner writes that apart from his treatises and 
some boldness, 
[Pelagius] displays few positive qualities and was certainly not the leader of the 
Pelagians once the battle began. His disciple, Caelestius, is a more impressive 
personality, the most effective man of action which the movement produced, but we 
have far too little material from his pen to evaluate him adequately.34 
This is why recent scholarship has become much warier of referring to “Pelagians,” noting that 
there were a number of differing thinkers surrounding Pelagius—or whom Pelagius himself 
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surrounded—who were not necessarily characterized by uniformity. In describing this circle, 
Carol Harrison has written of Pelagius’ Roman milieu as being “an extremely conservative elite 
of affluent, influential, lay aristocrats who self-consciously strove to set themselves apart by 
enthusiastic ascetic renunciation and observance of a strict moral code.”35 The continuity with 
the Donatist tradition is not difficult to see in Harrison’s description, although we should also 
add that the cohort around Pelagius were urbane. They tended to see themselves as representing 
cultured, cosmopolitan scholarship in contrast to the more rustic Augustine, who continued to 
use the outdated Vetus Latina instead of the fresh translations of Jerome.36 This brought with it a 
level of intellectual persuasiveness.37 But Brown is also right to see essentially Stoic roots to this 
Roman movement. The “good man” of pagan Rome had become the “good Christian,” 
something Augustine would point out at the beginning of De Natura et Gratia.38 Pelagius and his 
followers saw themselves as participants in a divine economy of merit and desert, held in the 
paradigms of Roman society rather than necessarily bringing fresh insights from the Scriptures.39  
Alaric and his invading Goths were Arian Christians, whose deviation from the orthodox 
faith made their victory all the more painful for orthodox Christians in the empire. But the full 
significance of the sacking of Rome lay in the significance of Rome for the empire. Brown 
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writes how for pagans Rome had come to be seen as a sort of “pagan Vatican”—a fortified place 
in which the old religion would survive, even if ravished in other places. Rome safeguarded the 
peace of the gods for the whole empire. And this had taken on Christian significance too. The 
remains of Peter and Paul in Rome had led to Christian mythic collusion with the pagan 
significance of Rome.40 And so the rise of Pelagius must also be seen in this context of 
preservation of the Roman way of life, even if in a Christianized form.  
Pelagius had been teaching and writing in Rome for years without attracting too much 
attention. But with the sacking of Rome and the subsequent emigration, Pelagius and his 
followers were forced to engage Christians beyond their own walls. One of these members of the 
Pelagian circle, Caelestius, landed with Pelagius in North Africa in 411. Pelagius landed in 
Hippo, but he never met Augustine, and soon travelled on to Palestine while Caelestius made his 
way to Carthage. Caelestius was something of the enfant terrible of the movement and the initial 
provoker of controversy.41 He approached Aurelius, the bishop of Carthage, and asked to be 
ordained. Not only did Aurelius deny his request, he accused him of heresy and condemned him, 
as Caelestius refused to renounce some condemned propositions.42 The Carthaginian jurist 
Marcellinus was called upon to judge Caelestius and his teaching, and it is at this point that 
Augustine was first drawn in to the controversy, albeit with Caelestius and not Pelagius. It would 
take years for him to engage Pelagius directly. Marcellinus wrote to Augustine for assistance, 
and Augustine responded with the first two books of De Peccatorum Meritis to which a third 
book was then added. Caelestius was duly condemned in Carthage in 411 for four errors: that 
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Adam had to die, that Adam’s sin injured him alone, that infants are born in a pre-lapsarian state, 
and that “Adam by his death [or by his sin] does not subject the whole human race to death; 
[because] Christ by His Resurrection does not give new life to the entire human race.”43 When 
Marcellinus further pressed Augustine on the issue of the necessity of grace, Augustine 
responded again with De Spiritu et Littera, which is the first time that he referred to the 
Pelagians as inimici gratiae Dei.44 
Pelagius himself continued to write from Palestine. In 413 he wrote a long letter to an 
aristocratic Roman woman Demetrias following her decision to become a nun. This letter was “a 
calculated and widely-publicized declaration of his message: “since perfection is possible for 
man, it is obligatory.””45 His teaching did not immediately raise the ire of Eastern bishops, and it 
took a Westerner to lead the charge against Pelagius in Palestine. Paul Orosius was a Spanish 
priest who had been drawn to Hippo after reading Augustine. Augustine used him as a 
messenger, sending him to Jerome in the summer of 415 (not yet with a copy of De Natura et 
Gratia which he told Jerome was “under way” 46). Orosius arrived in Bethlehem “full of anti-
Pelagian zeal” as Bonner puts it.47 His enthusiasm led first to the Synod of Jerusalem and later to 
a gathering of Eastern bishops at the 415 Synod of Diospolis to consider the case against 
Pelagius. They forced Pelagius to retract the proposition that “on the day of judgment there will 
be no mercy for the wicked and sinners, but they will be burned in everlasting fires.”48 But 
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Pelagius compromised well, distancing himself from Caelestius, and agreeing that no one had 
lived a perfectly sinless life, even though maintaining it was theoretically possible by a mixture 
of human labor and God’s grace.49 While the Eastern bishops were satisfied, the Africans were 
not. In 416 the African bishops sent a letter to Pope Innocent asking for Pelagius’ 
condemnation.50 Despite Pelagius’ referring to God’s grace, the African bishops called him and 
his followers inimici gratiae,  
a charge which had a good deal of plausibility; it was very difficult to find confession 
of grace in Pelagian writing in any form other than grace of creation, illumination, 
and remission of sins in baptism, since their denial of any transmission of Original 
Sin postulated a self-sufficiency in man's created nature.51 
While Pope Innocent agreed with the African bishops against Pelagius, his successor Zosimus, 
under the influence of Caelestius, considered Pelagius' teaching to be unobjectionable. And so 
the Africans appealed to the Emperor Honorius and the Imperial Court, who took charge with a 
declaration from Ravenna that condemned both Pelagius and Caelestius in 417. Zosimus duly 
conformed, and condemned them both in a letter that was sent throughout the East.52 In 418 the 
Council of Carthage met, attended by over 200 African bishops. They passed nine canons against 
Pelagianism, including condemning even the theoretical possibility of sinlessness, something that 
Augustine himself had expressed support for.53 While the controversy continued with Julian of 
Eclanum and in the so-called semi-Pelagian controversy, the condemnation of Pelagius was 
complete by 418.54 
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Just how many “Pelagians” were there? Augustine seemed to suggest that they were 
numerous in Africa, however the evidence is not overwhelming.55 Gerald Bonner notes that little 
is really heard of the circle around Pelagius after the condemnation of Caelestius in 411, much 
less after the condemnation of both Caelestius and Pelagius in 417. While the controversy 
continued throughout the 420s with Augustine and Julian of Eclanum’s fierce exchanges, there is 
no evidence to suggest that “Pelagianism” was a mass movement anywhere near the size of 
Arianism or Donatism.56 When Pope Innocent I was asked in 416 whether there were any 
Pelagians in Rome, he responded that he did not know.57 In his companion essay, Bonner 
suggests that Pelagianism “has been exaggerated by Church historians” in part due to its 
purported theological importance.58 He even attributes this partly to Luther, as he quotes Luther 
saying that the Pelagians “made a man of Augustine” who would otherwise have been “a very 
dry and thin teacher.”59 
The Writing of De Natura et Gratia 
Because De Natura et Gratia was written in 415, it was traditionally assumed that De 
Natura was written in the years directly preceding Augustine’s response, say around 413. Recent 
scholarship has, however, argued for an earlier date, around 405–406 when Pelagius would still 
have been in Rome.60 But it would have been much closer to 415 before Augustine ever heard of 
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this work. It was brought to his attention by two of Pelagius’ former pupils, Timasius and James, 
who wrote to Augustine requesting his comments on De Natura which they attached to their 
letter. This may have been in 413, but Serge Lancel thinks that it could have been at the end of 
414.61 
In looking at the place of De Natura within the context of Pelagius’ works, Robert F. Evans 
has noted that there is one significant feature of De Natura which is not present in Pelagius’ 
commentaries on Paul. Evans writes that Pelagius had sensed himself under pressure to 
acknowledge the role of grace in the Christian life, and so attributed the capacity to avoid sin in 
part to the gift of grace which was implanted in man by the Creator.62 While the recent revision 
of the date of De Natura would temper the notion that Pelagius was under any pressure at the 
time of writing, it is noteworthy for our study that De Natura stands as Pelagius’ most developed 
treatment of grace.63 Evans also thinks that De Natura marks a significant turning point because 
in it Pelagius employs Catholic orthodox thinkers to support his case. As we shall see, he looked 
for support for his case not just in Hilary, Ambrose, Chrysostom and Jerome, but even in 
Augustine himself.64 
De Natura et Gratia was probably finished in 415. When the African bishops appealed to 
Pope Innocent against the exoneration of Pelagius at the Synod of Diospolis, they attached a 
copy of Augustine’s treatise along with an annotated copy of De Natura.65 Augustine himself 
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also sent a copy to John of Jerusalem, who played an important role in the treatment of Pelagius 
in the East.66 We also know from one of Augustine’s letters that he considered De Natura et 
Gratia to be important to the debate and worth copying.67 
De Natura et Gratia Examined 
1.1–6.6 Summary of Controversy 
Augustine begins with some general remarks concerning what he takes to be Pelagius’ 
basic approach and error. He agrees with Pelagius that men ought not to blame their sins upon 
human nature. But Pelagius is “far too incensed at this evil”68 and so, in St. Paul’s words, he 
sides with those “who have zeal for God, but not in accord with knowledge. For, not knowing the 
righteousness of God and wanting to establish their own, they were not subject to the 
righteousness of God.”69 Pelagius’ is an overcorrection. In desiring men to take responsibility for 
their sins, he also seeks for men to take responsibility for their own righteousness rather than to 
find it in adiutorio gratiae Christi. For Augustine, the law produces a fear which is only useful to 
lead us, velut paedagogi, to grace. If not, then there is no need to become a Christian. Hanby has 
written that here Augustine rehabilitates the law, “now elided into Christ himself and the 
doxological economy manifest in him.”70 But Augustine seems more interested in contrasting the 
law with Christ, quoting—the first of many times in this treatise—Gal. 2:21: “For if 
righteousness comes through the law, then Christ has died in vain.” Augustine then quotes De 
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Natura at some length, where Pelagius ponders the fate of those who are yet to hear the word.  
What is human nature to do but believe in the God who made heaven and earth, the 
God whom it naturally perceives as its maker, and, by living correctly, fulfills his 
will, though it has not received any instruction in the faith concerning the suffering 
and resurrection of Christ?71 
Augustine repeats that if this were the case, Christ’s death would be in vain. If Christ’s death is 
not to be in vain, human nature can only be redeemed per fidem et sacramentum sanguinis 
Christi.72 Interestingly, it is Pelagius who here stresses a natural desire for God which is even 
redemptive, and Augustine who is more concerned with faith and the blood of Christ. As we 
shall discuss shortly, Augustine denies that salvation can come by a kind of cosmological 
participation in the Creator, even if one has led an exemplary life and never had the opportunity 
to hear of Christ.73 A few years earlier in De Spiritu et Littera he had written that it is only by the 
Holy Ghost that we can love God and participate in God.74 This is because while human nature 
per se is not to be blamed for sin, that does not make it pure.75 Augustine employs a medical 
analogy by declaring that human nature sana non est and needs a medico. Importantly, human 
nature continues to receive goods such as vita, sensibus, mente from God, but due to original sin, 
ex originali peccato, it has a defect, vitium, and is sick.76 Our natures are deserving of a 
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punishment which is completely just. Grace, then, is not merited, sed gratis datur, and those who 
do not receive grace receive a punishment that is fully deserved because they are not free from 
sin. God’s justice would thus be blameless even if he condemned everyone.77 Pelagius’ contrary 
position may “have the semblance of cleverness” but it is a “wordy wisdom that does away with 
the cross of Christ” and denies the scriptures.78 As Hanby has identified, there is a Stoicism in the 
Pelagian position which ultimately points to a nihilistic definition of man without reference to 
God. Augustine refers to this as a mistaken, Pelagian notion that we are “self-sufficient for 
righteousness.”79 
7.7–18.20 Sinlessness and Grace 
Having spoken broadly of what is at stake, Augustine then begins to work through De 
Natura in a more systematic fashion. He introduces the possibility of sinlessness in this life, a 
point which Pelagius and Augustine shared agreement on. Augustine, expanding upon Pelagius, 
distinguishes between what the Lord is able to do, and what he wills to do—something of an 
anticipation of the medieval distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. As we 
have noted, Augustine was open to the theoretical possibility of sinlessness in this life, until the 
418 Council of Carthage declared this position anathema.80 His openness was a result of his 
emphasis on the power of God’s grace, which could be employed according to whatever his 
sovereignty and freedom willed.81 Brown writes of a spirit in Augustine’s writings according to 
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which most things were possible by God’s grace. In contrast to some of the more memorable 
passages in the Confessions, Augustine never dramatized “the combat of chastity.”82 But in 
harmony with the first half of his celebrated prayer from the Confessions, he had full confidence 
that God could give what he commanded. 
But Augustine detects in Pelagius a different spirit. To illustrate this, Augustine raises 
Pelagius’ position that Adam’s sin is not contracted through birth, but rather propter imitationem 
of Adam’s sin. For Pelagius, an original sin that is infectious by birth could not bring any guilt 
upon men because they did not have the possibility of being anything else. While Augustine was 
willing, at this stage, to allow for the possibility of God’s grace to so overwhelm a person that 
they lived without sin, Pelagius did not so stress the grace of God, causing Augustine to suspect 
that he located this possibility in the ability of human nature, thus doing away with the cross of 
Christ.83 Augustine then quotes from De Natura, where Pelagius expresses a certain agnosticism 
concerning the means by which the possibility of sinlessness may be brought about: “Whether it 
is by grace or by a help or by mercy or whatever it is by which a human being can be without 
sin, whoever admits the reality also admits the means to it as well.”84 Augustine writes that upon 
reading this he was “suddenly flooded with joy” because it appeared that Pelagius was not 
denying the importance of the grace of God. But as he read on, he began to have “suspicions,” 
                                                 
 
understanding of divine sovereignty and human autonomy. Burns, Operative Grace, 95. 
82 Brown, Augustine, 511. See the Dolbeau s. 15*.5.6. 
83 Nat. et gr., 9.10. Stuart Squires has recently written that the Pelagian controversy was essentially about 
sinlessness and how we can free ourselves from sin. There is no doubt that this is a key aspect to the debate, but 
Squires’ case depends on an unwarranted exclusivity. He writes: “The standard view of the Pelagian controversy as 
centrally concerned with the nature of grace, while other issues of theological anthropology and soteriology (such as 
baptism, free will, and predestination) have orbited around this preoccupation, is largely dismissed today.” Squires, 
“Sinlessness,” 447. Curiously, he cites as his support for this claim a little known 1956 study. In contrast, the 
renowned scholar of the Pelagian controversy, Robert F. Evans, has asserted that grace was indeed “the real issue” at 
play. Evans, Pelagius, 7. 
84 Nat. et gr., 10.11 
 51 
because all of the analogies that Pelagius used concerned the power of nature such as a man 
arguing, a bird flying, and a rabbit running. 
He seems, in any case, to have mentioned things that nature can do, for these 
members, namely, the tongue, wings, and feet, were created for natures of this sort. 
He has not said the sort of things that we want to be understood in the case of the 
grace without which a human being cannot be justified, where there is a question of 
healing, not of creating natures. Already uneasy for this reason, I began to read the 
rest, and I found that my suspicions were not mistaken.85 
For Augustine, sinlessness, and thus freedom, is not something inherently a part of human nature 
but is rather the goal of the process of Christ’s gracious healing.86 That which Pelagius assumed a 
human being had from the start on account of his nature, Augustine proclaimed Christ was 
bringing about within us as we make progress by his grace.87  
It is important to note here that Pelagius did not deny the reality of grace, and seemed tired 
of people assuming he did.88 Augustine seems to be aware of this, and refrains from calling 
Pelagius inimicus gratiae even though he previously had, albeit without naming him, in De 
Spiritu et Littera.89 But what did he mean by grace? As his anthropological and zoological 
analogies show, Pelagius did not always stress a meaningful distinction between nature and 
grace. Both are at work in leading men and creatures to their natural ends.90 He does not always 
explicitly mention grace, because he does not consider it to be entirely separate from nature, 
even while he does not deny its reality. Thus Augustine and Pelagius agree that human efforts to 
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avoid sin remain futile without the support of divine grace, but they both mean different things 
by grace. Wegener, Lamberigts, and Lambert have recently written, in their summary of De 
Natura et Gratia: 
Augustine acknowledges that Pelagius does not deny the human dependence on 
divine grace. But he severely criticizes his opponent for equating grace with the 
natural capacities of human nature instead of recognizing its character as an 
undeserved gift granted by God.91 
But that is perhaps not as clear as it could be. Something can be both a part of the natural 
capacities of human nature as well as an undeserved gift granted by God. Indeed, Pelagius could 
affirm both with respect to grace. And, it is important to note, he did not completely elide grace 
into nature. Even though Jerome could condemn Pelagian “grace” as being no more than free 
will with God’s law as a guide,92 Pelagius does also speak of grace as the forgiveness which 
comes through Jesus Christ, especially in baptism.93 Indeed for Pelagius, baptismal grace seemed 
to bring a dramatic fresh start in contrast to Augustine’s insistence that the old man still 
endured.94 But this is a key to seeing their differences. For Augustine, grace was something to be 
continually received as the Christian lived their life in participation with Christ, something we 
shall explore further. In the faith which apprehends grace, “wrong actions are both forgiven and, 
by the help of grace, avoided.”95 Pelagius’ theology of grace was much more indebted to the 
Stoical vision whereby we operate in something of a closed circle, with baptism being a 
somewhat uncharacteristic intrusion of forgiveness, and the avoidance of sin being our 
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responsibility. Augustine acknowledges that Pelagius does not deny that we should ask for 
pardon, but he does note that Pelagius never counsels that one should pray for help so as not to 
sin.96 While we here need to note that John Milbank especially does share with Pelagius an 
approach to nature and grace marked by elision, Radical Orthodoxy seeks to elevate nature as 
God’s underserved and gracious gift in which we are continually participating, whereas Pelagius 
sought to domesticate grace as a deposit given to an autonomous humanity. In Eugene Portalié’s 
words: “The foundation of the Pelagian system, then, is the absolute independence of human 
liberty in relationship to God and its unlimited power for good as well as for evil,” something 
which has its origins in Stoicism. He goes on: 
According to Pelagius, man owes existence and freedom of choice (which he calls the 
possibility of good) to God the Creator. This is the only gift of God and, since it is 
gratuitous, Pelagius calls it a grace, playing on the words. Any further influence of 
God on freedom of choice would destroy it.97 
The fulfilment of this vision could be seen in Julian of Eclanum who proclaimed: “The freedom 
of the will is that by which man is freed from God,” something which von Harnack rightly said 
was essentially atheistic in structure as God becomes a spectator and not a participant.98  
Augustine invokes this participatory nature of grace by raising the topic of prayer. That the 
church prays with the Psalmist, “Guide my journeys according to your word, and let not 
sinfulness dominate me,” means that the Lord does not leave us up to our own resources and that 
his grace does in part help us avoid sin.99 Responding to Pelagius’ discussion of the book of 
James, Augustine writes that James is actually showing that left to ourselves, we have no hope 
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against sin. James teaches that “the human tongue is so great an evil that it cannot be tamed by 
any human being, though even wild animals are tamed by humans.” The goal is not despair or 
resignation, but that “we would beg the help of divine grace.”100 Augustine had raised this at the 
beginning of his treatise, namely that the law leads us to cling to God’s grace for help. Pelagian 
self-sufficiency, in which the law provides us with information regarding the proper conduct of 
our lives, leaves no room for prayer. As Augustine asks, “is someone going to oppose this prayer 
in order to avoid harm to free choice, because it is sufficient unto itself by its natural ability to 
observe all the commandments pertaining to righteousness?”101  
We can here see the validity of the Radical Orthodoxy concern that modernity has fostered 
a kind of Pelagian delusion of self-sufficiency. Augustine is well aware of the ramifications of 
Pelagian grace cutting off God and man from continual relationship with each other. This 
represents something of a development in Augustine. Burns notes that the newly converted 
Augustine believed in a certain amount of autonomy. His asceticism was of a piece with a kind 
of spiritual autonomy, free from bodily concerns, whereby he had the freedom to orient his mind 
towards darkness or light. Burns cites from the Cassiciacum dialogues in which Augustine had 
written things like: “The soul relies on its own natural resources and that assistance which God 
provides through human society,” and then also, “The work of divine Wisdom and Love neither 
supplement nor substitute for human action.”102 But Burns helpfully shows how the early 
Manichaean debates had made him circumspect about human freedom and self-sufficiency. The 
Manichaeans dwelt in a universe which was too voluntarist. And so, Burns writes, Augustine’s 
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“prior assertions of human autonomy were muted. The discussion of conversion shifted from the 
human quest for God to the divine approach to humanity in Christ.”103 Burns later adds, “The 
spiritual universalism of his Italian dialogues was finally shattered on the rock of Paul’s 
epistles.”104 But even in the Confessions, Burns argues, Augustine presents God’s operative grace 
as controlling decisions through external influences, what Burns calls “congruous vocation,” 
while keeping the essential freedom of the human spirit inviolate.105 There here comes a point at 
which Burns comes close to overstating his case regarding the Confessions, given that Augustine 
there acknowledges that God “is more inward than my most inward part”, or “closer to me than 
myself” (interior intimo meo), showing that Augustine’s anthropology is already explicitly anti-
autonomous.106 
By the time of De Natura et Gratia, however, Augustine had moved fully towards a 
conception of ongoing dependence on God for all things. One of the verses he cites the most 
during the Pelagian controversy is 1 Cor. 4:7: “For who has set you apart? But what do you have 
that you have not received?”107 De Lubac, and Radical Orthodoxy following him, are on 
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Augustinian ground when they stress the giftedness of all of life against a modernist, Pelagian, 
self-sufficiency from God. In Rowan Williams’ approximation of Augustine’s thought: “I do not 
know myself; but God knows me. God’s knowledge of me is available not as a picture I can 
grasp or as a piece of information, but in the form of trust in God’s love—faith, in other words. 
Such trust is grounded in and enabled by the history of Christ.”108  
19.21–32.36 Original Sin and Participation 
Augustine then introduces Pelagius’ counter-argument. Sin is either a substance, or it is 
something without any substance which only refers to an act of wrongdoing. Rejecting the 
former, Pelagius concludes that something which lacks substance cannot weaken or change 
human nature. Thus our nature remains free from injury.109 Augustine responds again with his 
appeal to Scripture and prayer, bringing Pelagius’ argument into debate with the Scripture. 
Would it be wrong, Augustine asks, to pray with the Psalmist “heal my soul, for I have sinned 
against you,” or to agree with the Lord that “it is not those who are in good health who need a 
physician, but those who are sick”? Taking up again this medical analogy, Augustine probes 
further: “What is there to heal, if nothing is wounded, nothing injured, nothing weakened and 
harmed?”110 This rhetorical pattern is common for Augustine, to first attend to the text of 
Scripture, and then to address the logic of the argument. Yes, he says, Pelagius is right to see that 
sin is not a substance. But, to take the case of food, not eating is also not a substance and yet if 
someone abstains from food, “the substance of the body wastes away” and it even begins to 
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reject food. Augustine then applies the analogy in an interesting way.  
So too, sin is not a substance, but God is a substance and the highest substance and 
the only true food of a rational creature. Listen to what the creature says, because it 
has withdrawn from this food by disobedience and is unable to take, by reason of 
weakness, what it ought to have enjoyed, My heart has been beaten and dried out like 
hay, because I have forgotten to eat my bread (Ps. 102:5).111 
The food the rational creature needs is God. By rejecting this “substance,” man not only is in 
need of forgiveness, but also in need of healing, because he has lost his appetite for God, for the 
very thing that he needs. This “lack” of God is not a substance, and yet it damages the substance 
of man and distorts it. Augustine goes on to quote from Romans, according to which God 
punished some by handing 
them over to the desires of their heart, to impurity ... For their women exchanged 
natural intercourse for that which is against nature. Likewise, the men too abandoned 
natural relations with women and burned with desire for one another, men 
committing perversities upon men. They received in themselves the mutual 
recompense of their error, as they deserved (Rom. 1:24–27).  
For Augustine then, sin, which is a lack of the substance of God, has led to a damaged nature, 
wrongly oriented and with diminished strength. If we continue without the substance of God, if 
God leaves us to the desires of our heart, we will not be left to what is natural, or even to a 
neutral decision, but rather to what is unnatural. Moreover, we bear the culpability for this 
damaged tendency towards the unnatural, for the recompense of error is deserved. The 
punishment of sin is thus not only external, but intrinsic to the damage which sin does to us.112  
This definition of sin thus continues Augustine’s stress on the need for ongoing 
participation in God. Sin has left us as discordant creatures who need concord.113 We have 
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already mentioned John Cavadini’s article, “The Darkest Enigma,” in which he sees that there 
exists no such thing as a stable, independent “self” for Augustine.114 If anything, we can see here 
that that is a more Pelagian position, whereby nature cannot be touched by sin because it is 
lacking substance. The lack of God for Augustine, however, has damaged us. Fleshing out his 
analogy of hunger, he writes: 
If one completely abstains from food, the substance of the body wastes away; it is 
destroyed by an imbalance in health, is drained of strength, and is weakened and 
broken by exhaustion to the point that, even if one somehow continues to live, he can 
scarcely be enticed back to food, though by abstaining from it his health was 
injured.115 
This is a condition that needs external help, so distorted have we become due to the rejection of 
God. Pelagius, Augustine writes, thinks that because it was our wills which led us to 
wrongdoing, it is our wills that now can set us on the right path. As if the remedy for a bad 
choice is a good choice. But sin has led to the death of the soul, which can only lead to more sin, 
and it “necessarily produces dead works until the grace of Christ brings it back to life.”116 We can 
even see in Augustine that our participation in God is not simply despite our sin, but, in a 
mysterious way, through our sin and suffering. Radical Orthodoxy stresses our continual 
participation in God as the source of all being in whom we continually receive our being. But 
Augustine also sees our need for God not just in terms of existence, but in terms of healing from 
sin. Peter Burnell has said that for Augustine our participation with God almost depends on sin to 
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counter our natural pride and make us aware of our dependence on God.117 Without fully 
understanding the woundedness of our nature, we are prone to an imagined self-sufficiency, 
which brings a theodical aspect to Augustine’s thought. Burns puts it this way: 
Augustine explained that God allows Christians to continue experiencing their 
weakness and dependence on the divine assistance in order to prevent a resurgence of 
the pride and self-reliance which caused the original fall of humanity. A lesser grace 
is given so that a greater sin may be forestalled.118 
We are participatory according to our status as created beings, but Augustine’s stress in De 
Natura et Gratia is our need also for God according to that part of us which is wounded by sin. 
That our being comes from God is undeniable, but as we have seen, Augustine is keen to show 
up the great distinction between Christians and good pagans.119 For example, in one of his 
sermons, Augustine says: “Even if I do not consent to it, there is still in me both something dead 
and something alive. Surely you cannot deny that this dead part of you belongs to you?”120 That 
which is alive corresponds to all human beings, but Augustine the bishop stresses a participation 
that restores that which is dead. And so in De Natura et Gratia, he continues by showing that 
there are evils which, by the mercy of God, lead to good. Again, Augustine does this by 
appealing to Scripture and prayer: 
Did the psalmist suffer something good when he said, You turned your face away 
from me, and I became confused (Ps 30:8)? Certainly not! And yet this confusion was 
in some sense a remedy against his pride. He had, after all, said in his prosperity, I 
will never be shaken (Ps 30:7) and attributed to himself what he had from the Lord. 
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For what did he have that he had not received? Hence, he had to be shown the source 
of what he had so that he might receive in humility what he had lost though pride.121 
Augustine rejects the position that God gives evil that grace may abound. But he also recognizes 
that we come to the humility which acknowledges our true dependence on God through sin and 
suffering. A little further on, Augustine writes of God’s redemptive use of suffering: 
[God] certainly acts with the aim of healing everything, but he acts according to his 
own judgment and does not take from the sick person the prescription for the cure. He 
undoubtedly wanted to make that man the strongest of apostles to whom he said, 
Virtue is made perfect in weakness (2 Cor 12:9), and despite his frequent prayers, he 
did not remove from him the thorn in the flesh.122 
Simply acknowledging our dependence on God for our being is not enough, for even the pagans 
can do that. There is also then a kind of participation in God which is not with respect to being, 
but has to do with our weakness and need for redemption through Christ. As he says later on in 
this treatise, every day we pray that our Father would forgive us our sins, as we forgive others. 
And by means of our supplications, “pardon immediately wipes away the sins we repeatedly 
commit out of ignorance or weakness.”123 But it is through our sins that are we are led to daily 
repentance and humility before God. As Augustine put it in one of his sermons: “When I say to 
you that without the help of God you do nothing, I mean nothing good, for you have the freedom 
of choice to act evilly without the help of God.”124 Augustine would not dispute that even acting 
evilly entails the “help” of God with respect to existence. But beyond being, we can be cut off 
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from participation in God. Augustine is here wishing clearly to distinguish between doing 
nothing with respect to being, and doing nothing with respect to what pleases God, between an 
order of creation and an order of redemption. This is crucial to understanding how Augustine 
conceives of participation, and it is a distinction that is not always evident in Radical Orthodoxy. 
In a more recent, parallel, example, W. Bachmann criticized Emil Brunner for ignoring “the 
communion with the Creator which has already been given to the sinner.” Brunner's Augustinian 
response in instructive: “But how can man be seen as sinner if he is not created by God! 
Communion with the Creator has been forfeited by sin. It has become life ‘under the wrath of 
God.’ ”125 For Brunner, everyone exists only in relation to God, but that relation, or even 
participation, can be negative or positive. “Indeed, sin itself is a relation to God: that of rebellion 
against the Creator, unbelief, ingratitude, apostasy.”126 
As Augustine moves in this direction in De Natura et Gratia, the medical analogies which 
he has predominantly employed begin to be stretched, for sin’s sickness extends to deceiving 
ourselves that “I will never be shaken.” In paraphrasing Romans 7:23 Augustine mentions that 
the law of sin leads to our members actually resisting, repugnat, the law of the mind.127 When 
Augustine then returns to the medical analogy, the patient never asks to be healed, but rather it is 
the Physician who is always the actor.128 These concerns lead Augustine to then take up Pelagius’ 
claim that all sins are sins of pride. Pelagius is led to this claim because he assumes that the will 
is a neutral actor, and that man can either decide to do what accords with God’s law, or what he 
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himself would prefer to do. Every sin is, in a sense, explicitly and consciously directed against 
God.129 Augustine, of all people, cannot disagree that pride is an inescapable scourge which 
afflicts us all.130 Yet he ultimately refutes Pelagius’ claim that all sin is pride in an effort to show 
that we are not equally predisposed to God and sin, but that we are oriented towards sin and to 
the deception that we are well. Because we are damaged by sin, we “are in poor shape and 
commit many sins either out of weakness or out of blindness,”131 “and often by persons weeping 
and groaning.”132 Augustine is led to this by his theological anthropology, but there is also here 
something of Augustine’s “defense of Christian mediocrity.”133 Interestingly, though, Augustine 
also wants to qualify this orientation towards sin. Following a catalogue of biblical supplications 
for mercy, salvation, truth, and support, he writes: 
[W]e do not take away the choice of the will, but we proclaim the grace of God. Who 
benefits from all these things, unless they are willing? But they must be willing with 
humility and not raise themselves up with pride over the powers of the will, as if it 
alone were sufficient for the perfection of righteousness.134 
This stands in contrast with the early Luther of the “Heidelberg Disputations” for whom desire is 
not merely in need of re-orienting but destruction. “The remedy for curing desire does not lie in 
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satisfying it, but in extinguishing it. In other words, he who wishes to become wise does not seek 
wisdom by progressing toward it but becomes a fool by retrogressing into seeking folly.”135 
Indeed in his “Preface to the Latin Writings” Luther called the failure to see that the law kills 
sinners and establishes something new altogether, the “Augustinian imperfection.”136 As Brown 
puts it, “The wisdom of God, for the old Augustine, bruised human reason.”137 But it never 
obliterated it. Michael Hanby has been right to emphasize that Augustine did not treat nature and 
grace, or human desire and grace, as a simple zero-sum game.138 When he looked back on De 
Natura et Gratia in his writing of the Retractiones, he described it as a work in which he “did not 
defend grace in opposition to nature, but the grace by which nature is set free and ruled.”139 
33.37–60.70 Faith and the Particularity of Grace 
Returning to the topic of sinlessness, Augustine agrees with Pelagius that sinlessness is not 
the same as being “on a par with God.” Augustine takes the opportunity to affirm the distinction 
between the creature and the Creator, adding that he is “not convinced” that we will be “changed 
into the divine substance and become exactly what he is.”140 Just as Augustine wants to hold up 
this distinction, so too he moves on to the distinction between the orders of creation and 
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redemption. Pelagius, Augustine writes, “thinks that he is pleading God’s case in defending 
nature.” But “in declaring this same nature healthy, he rejects the mercy of the physician… 
Hence, we should not praise the creator so that we are forced to say, indeed so that we are found 
guilty of saying, that the savior is unnecessary (superfluum).”141 Thus the righteous people of the 
Scriptures were not without sin. When we praise them, we ought not to imagine that their natures 
were perfect, or that they did not daily repent of their sins. Augustine notably says of Mary that 
“on account of the honor due to the Lord,” he does not want to discuss whether or not her nature 
was without sin.142 But his main point here is to stress that righteousness does not mean free from 
sin, with an uncorrupted nature, but rather the opposite. It is the righteous who speak the truth 
about themselves, and who “wage a daily and constant battle”143 against sinful desire, and so are 
forgiven their sins and granted freedom in Christ. As Burns puts it, “freedom in good is the 
consequence of the presence of God’s Spirit, not a natural property of any created being; 
servitude in evil follows inevitably from the exercise of free choice in the absence of grace.”144 
For Pelagius, sinlessness was possible not because of the power of intervening grace, but 
because of the strength of nature. The will, for Pelagius, was a neutral power, capable through its 
natural ability of choosing the right way to live, even if Christ had assisted in teaching it the right 
path. But if this is the case, Augustine repeats, then Christ has died in vain. If Christ was just a 
teacher, then his death was meaningless. But if indeed our righteousness was not capable of 
effecting salvation, then Christ’s death becomes intelligible as saving our “corrupt human 
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nature.”145 Sinlessness, for Augustine, was a possibility only by the grace of God, and not 
according to our nature.146 Augustine is here revealing a chasm that we have already seen 
between his and Pelagius’ thought—namely, whether salvation was an internal or an external 
power. Against Pelagius’ assertion of human autonomy and the will’s inalienable capacity to do 
good or evil, Augustine did not stress a sheer passivity that denied the will any role. But he did 
stress its dependence on external things, and the way in which human activity was limited. The 
internal power of sight is useless, for example, without the external provision of light. We may 
have the natural capacity to hear, and yet we hear many things “against our will.”147 Extending 
this reality, Augustine argues that love and concupiscence likewise come from outside of our 
will, from the Holy Spirit and Adam respectively. As Burns puts it, “In their origin each lies 
beyond human control. In their functioning, each effectively directs human operation. The 
Pelagians rejected his analysis of both.”148 This Augustinian relationship between receptivity 
complementing internal appropriation can be seen in the Formula of Concord. The confessors 
there state that Luther’s understanding that the will behaves “altogether passively” refers to the 
initial movement whereby the Holy Spirit converts us.  
But after the Holy Spirit has performed and accomplished this and the will of man 
has been changed and renewed solely by God’s power and activity, man’s new will 
                                                 
 
145 Nat. et gr., 40.47. It is worth noting that the Apology of the Augsburg Confession quotes this section of De 
Natura et Gratia at some length. It is especially concerned with Augustine’s criticism of those who think nature and 
free will could lead to a holy life, accusing them of rendering his death useless. Ap IV 29–30. The Apology again 
refers to this passage regarding free will. See Ap XVIII 69. 
146 See Nat. et gr., 44.51: “Even if I agree that there have been or are such [sinless] human beings, I still in no 
sense maintain that there have been or are such human beings unless they have been justified by the grace of God 
through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:25), and him crucified (1 Cor 2:3).” 
147 Nat. et gr., 47.55. 
148 Burns, Operative Grace, 117. 
 66 
becomes an instrument and means of God the Holy Spirit, so that man not only lays 
hold on grace but also cooperates with the Holy Spirit in the works that follow.149 
This summary is helpful in understanding how it is that Augustine can later say in De Natura et 
Gratia that our hearts are being made pure “by our efforts, labor, prayers, and pleas that by his 
grace we are being brought through Jesus Christ, our Lord, to that perfection in which we can see 
God with a pure heart.”150 The work of grace in us heals our broken wills so that we might be 
engaged in ongoing participation in God’s grace. God’s grace thus comes from outside of us, 
extra nos, and is solely active in the initial movement, and yet it also takes hold of something 
real within us. Because the will is not neutrally disposed towards God, on the one hand, and evil, 
on the other, as Pelagius would have it, it needs to be prepared by God and engaged by God—
“grace heals the will by which we freely love righteousness.”151 In a later work, Augustine would 
say that no one believes in God unwillingly, but this is not the result of the natural powers of the 
will, but rather because the unwilling are made willing by God.152 Thus for Augustine it is not 
that we necessarily lack the power to resist sin, but rather the will. And so God’s salvific, 
external grace, does not destroy us, but changes us, “because God does not produce our salvation 
in us as if we were mindless rocks or beings in whose nature he did not create reason and 
will.”153 God’s grace is not extraneous to his created beings. As St. Paul wrote in words which 
Augustine quotes in De Spiritu et Littera, “For it is God who produces in you both the willing 
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and the action in accord with good will.”154  
To put it another way as Augustine once did in a sermon, and to highlight an important 
distinction for our discussion of Radical Orthodoxy: qui creavit te sine te, non salvabit te sine 
te.155 God’s act of creation and his act of saving are different realities, even if they are both gifts 
of the one God. Milbank and Hanby are right to stress the latter, but they are wrong to ignore, or 
at least sideline, the former distinction. This is a theme which Augustine now addresses in De 
Natura et Gratia. Pelagius does not plead God’s cause when he defends nature. Rather God is 
served “better when one acknowledges both the creator and the savior than when one destroys 
the help of the savior by defending the creature, as if it were healthy and at full strength.”156 
Hanby, in an effort to highlight the giftedness of all creation, has referred to “Augustine's elision 
of creation and sanctification into a single economy.”157 There is of course, a continuity between 
these orders. Hanby expresses this by approvingly quoting Gerhart Ladner who said that for 
Augustine “only the saint truly is.” That is, creation already anticipates and finds its fulfilment in 
redemption. The saint “can become herself by becoming God’s.”158 And yet Hanby does not do 
justice to the importance Augustine stresses on distinguishing between creation and redemption, 
a distinction made stark by original sin, even if our substance is not identified with sin. Jaroslav 
Pelikan has correctly written that for Augustine, “creation was an act of sheer grace,”159 but that 
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is not necessarily the same as saying that nature and grace are a part of a single economy. In the 
context of the anti-Pelagian controversy, Augustine is more reluctant to speak about creation as a 
grace, even while fully acknowledging its being a gift of God.160 Thus he continues by saying 
that human nature needs grace “not that it may be created, but that it may be restored.”161 As he 
had clearly stated in De Trinitate, “What we have received in order to be is one thing, what we 
received in order to be holy is another.”162 The first does not involve us, but the latter does, 
through faith. Indeed it is Radical Orthodoxy’s lack of any meaningful discussion of faith which 
reveals its lack of a meaningful distinction between creation and redemption. As Augustine goes 
on to say, it is faith which heals us, “faith in the mediator between God and human beings, the 
man Jesus Christ, faith in his blood, faith in his cross, faith in his death and resurrection.”163 
Hanby, by contrast, claims that for Augustine distinctions between nature and grace, or creation 
and redemption, are ultimately mistaken. 
First, the understanding of these distinctions as marking different “moments” in the 
divine life is ruled out by God’s immutability, and is rather made intelligible by the 
fact that the activity of the effect qua effect is displayed precisely in its activity. 
Second, the differences in kind are rendered suspect by the ultimate convertability of 
esse and beatus within the magis and minus esse distinction. The recognition of some 
sort of specific distinction between the discrete “acts” of creation and sanctification, 
or between nature and grace, is only possible from the vantage afforded by a 
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perspective which privileges a bare and naked esse, or a Cartesian infinite, over the 
categories of good, beautiful and true.164 
Augustine is happy to attribute virtues even among non-Christians as being “the gift of God.”165 
So Hanby is right to see that Augustine opposes any sense of human autonomy, divorced from 
God, even among non-Christians.166 But faith nevertheless brings about a gift which is different 
from the gift of being and the gifts of character to pagans. It is a gift with which we are fully 
involved in so far as we already exist. And so Augustine’s interest is in the grace that restores, 
not the grace that creates or gives virtue to the faithless.167 Portalié writes: 
Augustine distinguished quite explicitly the two orders of grace: the grace of the 
natural virtues (a simple gift of internal providence which prepares efficacious 
motives for the will) and the grace for salutary and supernatural acts which is given 
with the first preludes of faith. The latter is the grace of children (gratia filiorum); the 
former is the grace for all—even strangers (filii concubinarum), Augustine adds, can 
receive it. Speaking of death courageously suffered by a heretic, he says that it is a 
gift of God, but far different from the gifts reserved for Christians: “As one cannot 
deny that this is a gift of God, so one must understand that there are other gifts of 
God for the children of that free Jerusalem which is above, our mother.”168 
The role of faith, for Augustine, thus demarcates the line between God’s different gifts of 
creation and redemption. While Paul says that “the righteousness of one led to the justification of 
life for all human beings,” Augustine nevertheless stresses that this does not mean that “all [do] 
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solidarities.” Brown, Augustine, 367. 
167 “gratia ergo dei, non qua instituatur, sed qua restituatur.” Nat. et gr., 53.62. 
168 Portalié, Augustine, 196. He is referring to De Patientia, 27.25. 
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believe in him” but just that no one can be justified “without believing in him.”169 Just as there is 
a distinction between creation and redemption, so too there is a difference between the ways in 
which we participate in these different orders. Radical Orthodoxy, and others, have been correct 
to show that receptivity is a part of human existence and that all beings are continually dependent 
upon God, who is Being, for their existence. But this participation is not faith, which is 
something not all are given. Augustine is thus keen to uphold a relationship between grace and 
faith which Radical Orthodoxy fails to notice. For Augustine, the exclusivity of this divine gift 
serves to distinguish grace from nature. In a later anti-Pelagian treatise, De Gratia et Libero 
Arbitrio, Augustine blames the Pelagians for daring to say “that grace is the nature by which we 
were created” rather than “the grace which comes through faith in Jesus Christ. For it is certain 
that we have this nature in common even with sinners and non-believers, but the grace through 
faith in Jesus Christ belongs only to those who have this faith. For not all have faith.”170 In the 
treatise under our consideration, Augustine likewise identifies within Pelagianism a tendency to 
elide nature and grace. Pelagius attempts to refute accusations that he ignores grace by saying 
that “whatever lies in the necessity of nature undoubtedly pertains to the author of nature, 
namely, God,” and so thus cannot exist apart from “grace.”171  
We shall consider in the next chapter to what degree this is similar to Hanby’s and Radical 
Orthodoxy’s referring to “Augustine's elision of creation and sanctification into a single 
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economy.”172 But for our present purposes, it must be said that one of Augustine’s issues with 
this is that nature does not discriminate, whereas salvific grace does. Pelagius’ theology thus 
begins to look like an attempt to reconcile God’s love with the scandal of particularity, resolving 
the question by rationalizing the distribution of grace to all people via their created nature. 
Pelagius had famously objected to Augustine’s prayer in the Confessions: “Give what you 
command, and command what you will.” Brown writes that this was because “it seemed to blur, 
by personal acts of favouritism, the incorruptible majesty of God the Lawgiver.”173 Augustine 
recognizes this, and challenges Pelagius to reconcile such universality with the validity of 
baptism. If human nature is so graced unto salvation, “Are those who are not yet baptized not 
included in human nature?”174 Of course they are, but Pelagius is reluctant to say that they lack 
grace or ability. For all of Augustine’s theology of participation, he definitely considers non-
Christians to be living without grace. Portalié is right to say that it is at least semi-Pelagian to say 
that all men receive “an equal measure of graces.”175 Augustine affirmed this in one of his letters: 
“We know it is not given to all men... We know that those who do not receive grace are passed 
over by a just judgment of God.”176  
As Augustine had stressed earlier, the righteous ones are not without sin, but are those who 
rather confess that to say they were without sin would be a lie. Baptism, Augustine now goes on 
to say, does not remove from us the opposition of the flesh, but it does bring the Holy Spirit’s 
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forgiveness and the ongoing strength to resist sin.177 The very existence of baptism challenges 
optimistic views of creation and reveals that indeed our natures are not healthy and that we are in 
need of a grace which is different from that of creation. Brown can thus state that “The nature of 
baptism provided the great watershed separating the two men.”178 Augustine continues: 
If we get these people to grant that those who have not yet been baptized should 
implore the help of the grace of the savior, this is no small victory against that false 
defense of nature and the power of free choice, on the grounds that they are self-
sufficient (sibi sufficientis). After all, he was not self-sufficient who said, Wretched 
man that I am! Who will set me free from the body of this death? Or are we to say that 
one has full freedom while still begging to be set free?179 
Augustine thus brings God’s grace to the concrete reality of baptism in the name of God and the 
reception of the Holy Spirit. It is the reception of the Holy Spirit which brings a person not to 
fear, but to love God and his commands.180 Burns is correct to point out that we can see here 
Augustine moving away from a generic natural desire for God. That would have supported the 
Pelagian cause by suggesting that within our nature there was an attraction to the goodness of 
God. There is also then a Pelagian danger in Milbank’s assertion that nature has an intrinsic 
desire for grace which is not only experienced as a lack, but even as an anticipation of grace. 
Lest Christ’s death be in vain, grace must always be unexpected and disorienting. Outside of the 
Pelagian controversy, Augustine did understand humanity to be created in the imago and ordered 
towards the similitudo of God.181 But that must be squared with Augustine’s insistence here that 
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it was the Holy Spirit that moved a person to love God.182 And only this working of the Holy 
Spirit created within the baptized Christian what Burns has called “an orientation to personal 
beatitude.”183 This points to another reality at play in this debate.  
The Pelagian position, while emphasizing personal responsibility for salvation, emphasized 
a cosmological view of God and was less enamored with a view of God that dealt discriminately 
and directly in personal particularities. In all debates about nature and grace, there is a tendency 
to abstraction, whereby grace becomes a metaphysical category rather than a gift of the Holy 
Spirit. Throughout De Natura et Gratia and indeed the entire Pelagian controversy, Augustine 
shows his concern not so much with the ubiquitous, cosmological grace of creation, but with the 
soteriological and particular grace of personal redemption through faith in the incarnate, 
crucified and resurrected Christ.184 Burns has rightly drawn attention to this aspect of the 
controversy, and sees that in Augustine continually referring matters back to the crucified Christ, 
he is warning against cosmology replacing a soteriology mediated through Christ.185 This is 
important, because the Augustinianism of Hanby draws in large measure from De Trinitate, 
which is concerned with ontological and metaphysical realities, and tends to read the Pelagian 
controversy through this lens. Hanby has written that Augustine's cosmology is “an aesthetic 
soteriology”186 and considers Augustine’s victory over Pelagius not as a triumph of grace over 
                                                 
 
182 Burns, Operative Grace, 112. See also Burns, Operative Grace, 125. 
183 Burns, Operative Grace, 111 n. 117. 
184 Nat. et gr., 44.51. Colin Gunton has levelled the critique that “Augustine, by losing the mediatorship of the 
Word, at once distances God from the creation and flattens out the distinction between the persons of the Trinity.” 
Colin Gunton, “Augustine, the Trinity, and the Theological Crisis of the West,” Scottish Journal of Theology 43, no. 
1 (1990): 33–4. But if Jesus Christ is the Word made flesh, then it is Augustine who is continually wanting to 
emphasize the mediatorship of Jesus Christ in the Pelagian controversy.  
185 Burns, Operative Grace, 96–97. 
186 Hanby, Augustine and Modernity, 27. Hanby goes on to say that Augustine’s ontology of the hypostatic 
union results in a reconfiguring of “cosmology as creation, creation as soteriology, soteriology as aesthetics and 
 74 
nature, but rather, as we have already had occasion to note, as a  
cosmological triumph. Implicitly it vindicated and instituted nature as the gratuitous 
creation of the transcendent God against the machinations of the pyr teknikon, the 
self-crafting fire of stoicism, for which any interaction between human and divine 
must be a “tensional” interchange between immanent forces.187 
As we have seen in this treatise, however, Pelagius was all too willing to see nature as the 
gratuitous creation of the transcendent God. But more to the point, Augustine moved throughout 
his career from a concern with cosmology towards soteriology.188 For example, in one of the 
recently re-discovered Dolbeau sermons, most likely delivered in 408 or 409, Augustine 
acknowledged “the obvious signs of order to be perceived in heaven and earth” which attest to 
God’s care for human beings. But this was an argument that the pagans largely shared in too. For 
the Christian, “the surest possible indication” of God’s care was not the order of the cosmos but 
the incarnation, death and resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ. “It is not only, therefore, the fact 
that God has a care for human affairs, but how much he cares, which we are given the surest 
possible proof of by the manifest reality of Christ's birth, by the patient endurance of his death, 
by the power of his resurrection.” The creation and direction of the cosmos only reveals God’s 
providence, whereas it is in the God-man Jesus Christ that the love of God is revealed.189 The 
order of creation was evidence of the Creator, but it was the humiliation of Christ which revealed 
the more important reality of God’s love for humankind. As Peter Brown has put it, “the cosmos 
was largely stripped of religious meaning for Augustine because the centre of gravity of his 
thought had shifted elsewhere. He was concerned with a more urgent matter—how might God 
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reach out to save humankind.”190 And as we have seen Augustine argue in De Natura et Gratia, 
there is no salvation by belief in the creator, even if one has had no opportunity to hear of 
Christ.191 Brown elaborates on this Augustinian perspective: 
Augustine would never look up at the stars and gaze at the world around him with the 
shudder of religious awe that fell upon Plotinus, when he exclaimed “pas de ho 
khôros hieros”: “All the place is holy.”... Augustine pointedly refused to share in this 
enthusiasm. He viewed the Platonic notion of a World Soul, a majestic anima mundi 
that gave life and vividness to the entire realm of nature, as an uninteresting and 
basically unnecessary speculation: if such an entity existed at all, all that mattered 
was that it should not be worshipped instead of God. That was all that needed to be 
said on the matter.192 
This is not to say, as we have already noted, that Augustine was a proto-Cartesian. Man is not 
isolated or autonomous for Augustine. His is not so much an inward turn as a soteriological, 
personal turn from a kind of Plotinian cosmological theology. But it is a turn nevertheless, and 
one that does not shy away from the scandal of the particularity of God’s grace in Christ Jesus. 
61.71–68.82 Catalogue of Testimonies 
In the final section of this treatise, Augustine runs through some of the arguments that 
Pelagius had drawn in his own support from other Christian writers. As we have noted earlier, 
Evans thinks that this marks a turning point in the debate because Pelagius is no longer keeping 
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to himself but drawing some pillars of the faith into his theology, including Augustine.193 
Nevertheless Augustine seems to be disparaging of the importance of this when he notes that 
Pelagius is looking for support “not from the canonical scriptures but from some writings of 
Catholic commentators.”194 Augustine comes to the defense of the orthodox writers Pelagius had 
employed, and takes the opportunity to reiterate some of the key points of the treatise, while also 
taking some delight in pointing out those parts of the full quotations which Pelagius had skipped 
over, such as when Ambrose added, “Nor was the Church spotless from the beginning—this is 
impossible for human nature.”195 Then to Pelagius’ invocation of John of Constantinople on sin 
not being a substance, Augustine can only agree, while reiterating the centrality of the distinction 
between creation and redemption:  
But our question is not about human nature as it is found in this life; our question is 
rather about God’s grace by which it is healed through Christ the physician, whom it 
would not need if it were healthy. And yet this man defends nature as if it were 
healthy and as if the choice of the will were self-sufficient for being able not to sin.196 
As Augustine continues, the centrality of the means of grace is highlighted. He is repeatedly 
happy to affirm statements about men becoming like God, having a pure heart, and being sons of 
God, so long as it is clear that this is done by the grace of Jesus Christ the mediator, and by the 
Holy Spirit who has been given to us.197 This too is the case when he comes to his own work, De 
Libero Arbitrio, from which Pelagius had quoted. Pelagius had quoted that section where 
Augustine says that if the will cannot avoid evil, then it does not sin, “for who sins in a matter 
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that can in no way be avoided?” In his response, Augustine seems to adjust his prior statement, 
stating that whatever challenges the will faces, they can be resisted, for “we would not demand” 
that the Father would lead us not into temptation “if we believed that we could not resist.” Then 
returning to his theme, he says that “sin can be avoided, but it is avoided with the help of him 
who cannot be deceived.”198 Providing a fuller quote from his work, Augustine affirms that he 
did exhort people to live good lives, but he also “did not destroy the grace of God without which 
human nature cannot be enlightened and healed, once it has been plunged into darkness and 
injured.” He then writes, “The whole dispute with these people turns on this point: that we do not 
render meaningless the grace of God, which is found in Christ Jesus, our Lord, by a misguided 
defense of nature.”199 Burns understandably says that it is thus grace, and not sinlessness, that 
Augustine sees as being at the heart of the Pelagian controversy.200 And yet, given that Pelagius 
affirmed a doctrine of grace, it is the nature of this grace as something in which we continually 
participate and by which we are being redeemed that Augustine specifically wants to stress. 
In completing our analysis of De Natura et Gratia, we can note that Augustine in his final 
words shows an abiding concern for the “mediocre Christian.” His teaching, he hopes, will help 
those Christians who are experiencing difficulty in their Christian lives to “persist in asking the 
Lord with faith-filled and persevering prayers and with eager works of mercy.” He writes that he 
is not so concerned about the erratic journey of healing and righteousness, but more that this can 
only come about “by the grace of God through Jesus Christ, our Lord.”201 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EXTRA NOS BUT NOT EXTRANEOUS 
In the year 2000, a new edition of Peter Brown’s classic biography of Augustine was 
released, with two new chapters by the author. In reflecting on the state of current Augustinian 
studies, Brown wrote that “we want Augustine to talk to us now about sexuality and marriage, 
not about grace and the Church.”1 In the light of contemporary discussions on Augustinian grace 
this seems to have been a premature judgment. In this chapter we will look at how the reading of 
De Natura et Gratia brings concrete implications for discussions on nature and grace that wish to 
be Augustinian today. Of course, a reading of just one treatise cannot hope to give the full 
Augustinian picture of nature and grace. And yet it can help to identify the parameters of 
Augustine’s approach, and the proposals which he explicitly rejects. In particular, we will 
discuss how boundaries are important for Augustine in the Pelagian controversy, and yet he 
never actually opposes nature to grace, seeking rather to affirm a continuity between the gifts of 
God. The grace of God in Jesus Christ always comes extra nos, but is never extraneous to who 
we are. For Augustine then, redemptive grace is different from the gift of creation. But it also 
corresponds to our created nature in a way that prevents it from being, as Milbank put it, “no 
more a gift than is a brick wall we might inadvertently run into.”2 
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Participation 
Some contemporary approaches to nature and grace have considered Augustine’s 
contribution to the debate relatively unimportant. Steven A. Long and Lawrence Feingold have 
both recently written solid contributions to the theology of nature and grace, but have discussed 
the matter in largely Thomistic terms.3 This has prompted David Grummett recently, and rightly, 
to ask, “Why has the notion that, for de Lubac, Augustine was less important than Thomas so 
easily found acceptance?”4 This thesis can be situated within the attempt to redress this 
imbalance. 
Some Augustinian scholarship had already been moving in the direction which Radical 
Orthodoxy has moved. Peter Burnell, for example, has written in his The Augustinian Person 
that for Augustine “though the inability to sin is a strictly divine attribute, human nature is 
nevertheless incomplete until completed by it. The divine gifts constitute human nature’s 
perfection and are not mere superadditions to it.”5 But there are others who have sought to 
engage, and criticize Radical Orthodoxy for the way in which it reads Augustine. These 
criticisms will be useful for us in opening up the issue of what it means to be faithfully 
Augustinian today.  
In 2007 the journal Ars Disputandi ran a colloquium on Hanby’s Augustine and Modernity 
in which Johannes Brachtendorf and Maarten Wisse wrote pieces somewhat appreciative, and 
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yet largely critical of Hanby’s reading of Augustine.6 Brachtendorf was especially forthright in 
his critique. 
The reader gets the impression that Hanby developed his thought construction 
independently of Augustine and mined Augustine secondarily for particular 
statements that he could use for his purposes. Hardly a central element in Hanby's 
project truly stems from Augustine; much even contradicts the thought of the bishop.7 
Brachtendorf’s concern is that Hanby sees everything in metaphysical terms, neglecting 
Augustine himself. We noted at the outside that Hanby’s lack of exegetical treatment was 
problematic, and does leave him open to this kind of critique. His concern to read all of 
Augustine through De Trinitate, or at least his own reading of De Trinitate, is too ambitious to 
stand without proper attention to Augustine’s texts. But Brachtendorf’s somewhat visceral 
response also vindicates the merits of Hanby’s challenge to Augustinian studies, for he is far 
from being as unfaithful to Augustine as Brachtendorf makes him out to be. But Brachtendorf 
does point out some areas where Hanby is lacking. 
Whereas Augustine thinks of sanctification as a concrete, historical event—a call 
issued in history beckoning the human who has turned away from God, Hanby casts 
sanctification as a metaphysical datum that has always already determined the being 
of humans.8 
This criticism is not, as we have seen, altogether unwarranted. In De Natura et Gratia, Augustine 
showed his concern for matters of soteriology, and less for questions of the nature of being and 
creation. To ignore this aspect of Augustine, or to subsume it into ontological concerns, misses 
Augustine’s stress on the biblical language of healing through the blood of Christ crucified. 
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Brachtendorf complains that by eliding nature and grace into a single economy, there is no 
“outside” of the economy between the Father and the Son.9 
The Tübingen scholar Maarten Wisse offers a more nuanced, critical approach. He agrees 
with Hanby’s rejection of the supposedly proto-Cartesian Augustine, denying a place for reading 
Augustine as espousing a kind of autonomous consciousness. However, Wisse finds Hanby’s 
language of “being in God” less helpful than his own suggested phrase, “being in relation with 
God.” This is because the former underplays the ontological distinction between creature and 
Creator. Indeed, Wisse has been committed to rejecting any kind of participationist ontology 
with respect to Augustine, and has written a monograph in part rejecting Radical Orthodoxy’s 
reading of Augustine called Trinitarian Theology Beyond Participation: Augustine’s De Trinitate 
and Contemporary Theology.10 While affirming the need to read Augustine systematically, Wisse 
nevertheless seeks to develop a systematic Augustinianism in “almost the opposite form” to 
Hanby.11 Wisse stresses that while Augustine does see all being as participating in God in some 
way, nevertheless there is still the possibility for Augustine of existing “outside Christ,” in direct 
contrast to Radical Orthodoxy.12 This is because the logic of creation is not identical to the logic 
of God, and creation through the Word is different from recreation in Christ. Wisse understands 
that his critique would thus bring a “death blow” to Radical Orthodoxy, because it would reject 
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the central Radical Orthodoxy critique of nihilism by denying that all reality is grace.13 Wisse has 
developed this critique in another recent article, dissecting Radical Orthodoxy’s genealogy. For 
Wisse, the Nouvelle Theologie received Augustine's theology through an “incarnational 
ontological framework, which made it more compatible with a natural theology and a Thomistic 
notion of analogy,” focusing especially on those aspects of Augustine's thought which “tend 
towards the idea that the world bears traces of God's being and exists by participating in the 
divine.” Regarding de Lubac, Wisse writes that “one can hardly say that he receives Augustine 
on his own terms.”14 Instead, de Lubac uses Augustine to criticize the scholastic neo-Thomism of 
the early twentieth century and its separation of nature and supernature.15 But Wisse’s criticism 
has sustaining weight because he largely agrees with Radical Orthodoxy’s critique of the 
impoverishment which Kantian metaphysics has had on modern theology. The irony of de Lubac 
being accused of modernism by neo-scholastics and Pius XII is not lost on him: 
The neo-Thomists attempted to respond to modernity through a Kantian 
reinterpretation of a separation between nature and grace, sticking to an anti-Kantian 
emphasis on the tenability of Aquinas’s five ways, thus proving the existence of God 
apart from grace. They combined this form of natural theology with a strong stress on 
the necessity of revelation and the mediatory role of the Church, which was the 
reason they rejected forms of ‘Ontologism’, in which one would have access to God 
without the salvific role of the Church. 
De Lubac, however, saw a strong form of modernism in this approach, as it made the 
world and all we know strictly secular, dependent only on our secular reason and 
independent of any need for grace. For de Lubac, the separation of the natural and 
supernatural was in severe contradiction with the tradition, Augustine, all the early 
Christian writers, and also the medieval tradition. There is nothing that God created 
that was not in itself already—think of Christ's role as mediator in creation—grace. 
Salvific grace through the Church is the restoration of nature, it cannot merely be an 
                                                 
 
13 Wisse, “Was Augustine a Barthian?,” 18. 
14 See also Bernard Mulcahy, who judges de Lubac's scholarship to be sometimes flawed, tending to be 
“more broad than deep.” Bernard Mulcahy, Aquinas’s Notion of Pure Nature and the Christian Integralism of Henry 
de Lubac (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), 147–48. 
15 Wisse, “The First Modern Person?,” 110–11. 
 83 
accidental addition to it. If something like ‘pure nature’ exists, then the typically 
modern world with all its individualism and secularism is true, and the world as such 
has no need for God. Then a world without God—de Lubac’s French world after the 
revolution—is the real world.16 
As we have noted in the first chapter, however, the late de Lubac was not blind to the dangers of 
participationist ontology which elided nature into grace. He approvingly cited Jacques Maritain’s 
statement that “St Augustine taught as clearly as possible the ontological value of the distinction 
between nature and grace.”17 He recognized the Charybdis of the economy of separation, as well 
as the Scylla of Platonist participation.18 Rudolf Voderholzer puts it this way: 
Both Augustinism and neo-scholasticism misjudge the paradoxical structure of 
human nature. The Augustinians, with their identification of nature with grace, cannot 
preserve the freedom of grace, while the adherents of the doctrine of natura pura, 
with their separation of nature and grace, lose sight of the way human nature refers 
back to God. De Lubac advocates not separating the two but making a distinction 
between them: yet to distinguish in order to relate one to the other.19 
Our study has shown that it is Radical Orthodoxy, and Milbank in particular, which takes de 
Lubac “further”, by attempting to resolve what de Lubac wished to maintain as a paradox, a 
development to which Wisse does not do full justice. Wisse also tends to paint Hanby with a 
Milbankian brush, something which we shall see is not completely justified. But his critique of 
participationist ontology is nevertheless compelling.  
In this aspect of Milbank’s Platonizing thought, there is a danger of almost returning full 
circle to Pelagianism by affirming that the grace of God through Christ Jesus is already with us, 
on account of our participation in God. Of course, for Pelagius, grace tended to be a gift 
completely given in creation to an autonomous humanity, whereas for Radical Orthodoxy grace 
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is a participatory gift, continually given and received. But nevertheless, both Pelagianism and 
Radical Orthodoxy are in danger of sharing a rejection of any discrimination on God’s behalf. 
Neither consider it possible to exist outside of God’s grace, even if grace is defined radically 
differently. In contrast, Augustine considers the exclusivity of grace to be crucial. In a letter 
against the semi-Pelagians, Augustine includes this rule of faith: “This gratuity is proved by the 
distribution of grace: God does not give it to all, but to those whom He wills.”20 Wisse’s 
preferred term of “being in relation to God” thus allows for the Augustinian possibility of that 
relationship being a negative one, even if it does flirt with acknowledging a modernist autonomy. 
As Emil Brunner was to say in one the more recent flare-ups of the nature and grace controversy, 
“sin itself is a relation to God: that of rebellion against the Creator, unbelief, ingratitude, 
apostasy.”21  
To speak of man is to speak of God. Not that man is “divine”; but man is man 
because he always stands in relation to God, either negatively or positively, and this 
relation to God, in the negative or positive sense, is the key to the understanding of 
man and the kernel of his being. Revelation is not something that is added to man's 
being; it is there even when it is denied, rejected, and ignored.”22 
Wisse himself stands in this tradition and cites Brunner approvingly. While Brunner had agreed 
with Karl Barth’s critique of a natural theology in which we can come to God independent of 
revelation, he nevertheless argued for a “point of contact” (Anknüpfungspunkt) in human nature. 
In Wisse’s summary of Brunner, “human beings have a natural sensitivity to revelation because 
they have been created by God, and, therefore, always stand before God, even and precisely 
when they deny this through sin.”23 But Brunner goes even further than this, seeking to 
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22 Brunner, Revelation and Reason, 54. 
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acknowledge that grace or revelation is not completely extraneous to who we are. In a section 
called “Man and Revelation” of his Revelation and Reason, he writes: 
If revelation is really encounter, then we cannot understand it without knowing 
something of him to whom it is made. If revelation is God’s self-communication to 
man, then it is of decisive importance to know the man to whom God communicates 
Himself. 
... This obvious point must be stressed, because a false interpretation of the sola 
gratia, and the fear of Pelagian doctrine or of “synergism,” has led some theologians 
to confuse the absolute receptivity of man in the revelation with an objective 
passivity from which all human activity, as such, could be entirely eliminated.24 
Brunner is thus seeking to carve out room for seeing grace and revelation as actually taking hold 
of something in man, and not being as unwelcome as a brick wall we might inadvertently run 
into, while also seeking to affirm its exteriority and its discriminating exclusivity. In this line of 
thinking, it is uncontroversial to say that all things are related to God. But it is equally 
uncontroversial to say that all things are not thereby justified, made holy, or received into the 
kingdom of God. But in the vision of theologians like Brunner and Wisse, relation to God is 
essentially established with respect to grace. Whether it is positive or negative, relation is never 
the same as participation because it is not with respect to nature. Radical Orthodoxy can tend to 
the opposite pole, whereby it is essentially with respect to our created and graced nature that our 
participation with God comes about. Thus the Radical Orthodoxy theologians John Milbank, 
Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward write the following: 
The central theological framework of radical orthodoxy is ‘participation’ as 
developed by Plato and reworked in Christianity, because any alternative 
configuration perforce reserves a territory independent of God. The latter can lead 
only to nihilism (though in different guises). Participation, however, refuses any 
reserve of created territory, while allowing finite things their own integrity.25 
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While Radical Orthodoxy has looked to Augustine for this, Reinhard Hütter offers a 
compelling challenge to this. In a characteristically authoritative article, he argues that John 
Milbank and Henri de Lubac are best understood to be standing in an Origenist and Nyssan 
tradition, despite their appeals to Augustine. The doctor of grace, rather, belongs to a different 
historical tradition which sees the desire for God as needing to be elicited and which has stronger 
ontological resources against universalism.26 Rowan Williams is another theologian who, while a 
friend of Radical Orthodoxy, also sees Augustine as representing that tradition which recognizes 
the danger of seeing our nature as continuous with God’s grace, in that we neglect our right 
stance of repentance and incapacity and treat God “as the fantasized completion of the self.”27 
Repentance—which goes further than thanksgiving or praise—is a necessary part of any 
redemptive relationship with God, for it establishes the extra nos nature of the grace of Christ 
Jesus. 
[For Augustine,] instead of climbing up to Heaven to find the eternal Word, you have 
to grasp that the eternal Word has come down from Heaven to find you. And this 
happens when you see yourself not as a boldly questing intellectual mystic, but as a 
sick person in desperate need of healing, someone whose reality cannot be completed 
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by their own work and attainments but only by a relationship offered completely from 
outside.28 
This repentant posture was something that Augustine had already come to stress in the 
Donatist controversy, that purity was not earned but received. And his invocation of the Psalms 
and prayer in De Natura et Gratia, along with a stress on the sickness and disordering of the will, 
shows his continual fixation with this humility in the redemptive order before God. The practice 
of repentance thus opens up a way of looking at participation in God but without the universalist 
overtones of participationist ontology, and as a participation in God wrought in the realm of 
redemption and not just creation. As Williams put it in a different context regarding Augustine, 
“without accepting our radical difference from God, we cannot be united with God.” Union with 
God for Augustine thus “never ceases to be the union of finite with infinite; it never becomes an 
identity of substance.”29 Charles Mathewes has written that Augustine’s anti-Pelagian theology 
“was not a pessimistic centering insight into the vanity of human endeavour, but a joyous 
celebration of the sovereignty of God's grace.”30 But that is to oppose what must be held 
together. Only in repentance can the sovereignty of God’s grace be celebrated. Only in 
repentance, acknowledging as it does the possibility of existing outside of God’s grace, or in a 
relationship of judgment, can a relationship of receptivity and joy in Christ take hold.31  
Observing Boundaries 
Hans Boersma has been another critic of Radical Orthodoxy’s reading of Augustine, along 
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somewhat similar lines as Wisse’s critique of its participationist ontology. In a perceptive article, 
he finds that despite some similarities, Radical Orthodoxy, as revealed in the writings of Milbank 
and Ward especially, and Augustine are “fundamentally at odds” with one another. While 
Boersma agrees that Augustine is not modern, he also stresses that neither is he postmodern, but 
rather premodern. So while Augustine does see created reality as participating in a cosmic order, 
that order “has borders that are defined and maintained by God.” Reinhard Hütter has made a 
similar criticism: 
Where everything is grace all the way down in one and the same way, albeit of 
infinitely differing intensity, everything that has been brought into being, must have 
its end in God, by necessary ontological entailment. While undoubtedly a grandiose 
speculative vision, it, however, is neither the teaching of the Scriptures nor of the 
Church.32 
Our reading of De Natura et Gratia confirms Boersma’s and Hütter’s assessment here, and 
reveals Milbank’s project to be perhaps postmodern and critical, but not Augustinian. As we 
have seen, at the center of Augustine’s argument is the distinction between God the creator and 
God the savior, as is his desire to attribute different work to these different actions of the one 
God.33 The problem of a participationist ontology for Boersma is that there are no boundaries or 
meaningful distinctions. Radical Orthodoxy works instead “with a postmodern understanding of 
reality as human construct—its “ontology of peace”—in which boundaries and identities are at 
the very least always in flux (perhaps even nonexistent) and always dependent on human powers 
of persuasion.”34 This approach can be seen, Boersma argues, in the fruit of Radical Orthodoxy’s 
“antinomian moral theology, particularly in its inability to give guidance in terms of sexual 
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ethics and in its hesitancy to acknowledge the legitimacy of the use of force in defense of 
valuable temporal ends.”35 It is not surprising that in a different article from a year earlier, 
Boersma raises real questions as to the possibility of any Reformed dialogue with Radical 
Orthodoxy at all, given Milbank’s tenuous articulation of truth as merely that which is persuasive 
and also his general disregard of the Reformation and its heirs.36 In his more programmatic 2006 
article, he continues, 
This participatory ontology amounts to a radical denial of any kind of immanentism 
in which the created order and human reason take on independence vis-à-vis the 
Trinitarian life of God. Creation and human reason are only real insofar as they 
participate in the divine life.37 
He goes on: 
Milbank even ends up with a denial of the Creator/creature distinction: He bases the 
obliteration of boundaries in the Incarnation, that is to say, in the violation of the 
“boundary between created and creator, immanence and transcendence, humanity and 
God.” 38 
It should be noted here that in the work from which Boersma is citing, Milbank does further on 
say that God did obliterate the Creator/creature division, “however, in doing so, he also 
preserved [the division].”39 Indeed, whether Radical Orthodoxy is in danger of a Monophysite 
Christology remains something of an open question. Eliding nature and grace does not 
necessarily correspond to eliding, or failing to distinguish between, the two natures of Christ.40 
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And the “elision” of which Radical Orthodoxy speaks, at least in Hanby, is not so much an 
obliteration as an ordering. Thus Hanby writes that a “proper Augustinian response to the divine 
voice is not a flight from the temporal, but a proper referral of the temporal to its eternal origin 
and end.”41 Milbank’s qualification about preserving the division appears to be an attempt to 
acknowledge the necessary distinctions within Scriptural theology. But Boersma rightly argues 
that the overarching framework of Radical Orthodoxy works against such boundaries. Picking up 
Hütter’s analysis, we could say that its Origenist tradition brings with it a universalism that is 
hard to escape. Thus Boersma goes on to note that the result of the eradication of boundaries can 
be seen in Graham Ward’s claim that “from Augustine I take the insight that we need to suspend 
judgment concerning other faiths.”42 This nonsensical statement again shows how in seeking to 
oppose Pelagian autonomy with all of its might, Radical Orthodoxy can fall into a kind of 
Pelagian non-discriminatory anthropology in which all are already, and equally, graced by means 
of the gift of creation. As Pelagius put it in De Natura, 
What is human nature to do but believe in the God who made heaven and earth, the 
God whom it naturally perceives as its maker, and, by living correctly, fulfills his 
will, though it has not received any instruction in the faith concerning the suffering 
and resurrection of Christ?43   
It is not hard to hear, in opposition to Ward and the universalism of Radical Orthodoxy, 
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Augustine’s cry in De Natura et Gratia that this would render the cross of Christ void.44  
In looking at the dangers of Radical Orthodoxy going full-circle on Pelagianism, there is 
another aspect that we might note. As we saw in De Natura et Gratia Augustine had intuited that 
Pelagius’ treatment of nature seemed to allow no distinction between the baptized elect and those 
not baptized. If all of human nature has been graced, what is the point of baptism? Because 
Pelagius spoke so positively of human nature, Augustine could ask: “Are those who are not yet 
baptized not included in human nature?”45 Pelagius had a hard time dealing with baptism, 
because his theological vision tended to deal in more universal categories. We can see this in the 
errors for which Caelestius was condemned in Carthage in 411. As we have noted, the 
condemned articles were: 1. Adam had to die; 2. Adam's sin injured him alone; 3. Infants are 
born in pre-Fall state; 4. “Adam by his death [or by his sin] does not subject the whole human 
race to death; [because] Christ by His Resurrection does not give new life to the entire human 
race.”46 Regarding this fourth point, Pelagian theology inferred that the sinfulness of the world 
was evidence that the resurrection had not brought new life to all, and so also then the sin of 
Adam could not have stained all. If Adam’s sin has affected the entire human race, as Augustine 
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had claimed, why has not the redemption of Christ therefore redeemed all of humanity? Is 
Augustine saying that the power of Adam was greater than that of Christ? That sin’s power is 
stronger and more pervasive than Christ’s? Thus as Bonner has written, the “Pelagians” “had no 
characteristic theology, other than a denial of any transmission of Original Sin.”47 Faced with the 
dilemma of Adam’s universality and Christ’s limited influence, they resolved the tension by 
limiting both. Milbank is keenly aware of this dilemma too, and yet resolves it in the opposite, 
but nevertheless mirrored, way to the Pelagians. That is, rather than treat Adam’s sin and Christ’s 
resurrection as limited, Milbank treats both as cosmically present so that Christ’s resurrection 
claims everyone, as all were created through Him and for Him. As Milbank put it: “After all, 
how could charis be a less original or plenitudinous gift than esse?”48 But we can remember that 
Augustine in De Natura et Gratia, in seeing sin as a lack which distorts our will, considers grace 
to be something resisted by the natural man, who has lost his appetite for fulfillment in a 
completely different way to how God brings us into being from nothing.49 A key text here is 1 
Cor. 15:21-2: For as by a man came death, by a man has come also the resurrection of the dead. 
For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. But the following verse is 
instructive also: But each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits, then at his coming those who 
belong to Christ. In the context of the cosmic, objective victory of Christ, St. Paul nevertheless 
sets a boundary regarding those who belong to Christ. The scandal of particularity must establish 
an ontology of boundaries which Radical Orthodoxy has rejected and thus remains skewed. As 
we have noted, Hanby thinks that distinguishing God’s actions threatens his divine 
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immutability.50 He has also noted that he regards the question of predestination “as at best a 
secondary concern.”51 But that is in danger of siding with the Pelagians, against Augustine, 
whom Boersma is right to argue held to an ontology of participation with boundaries. We need 
only recall the two cities of De civitate Dei—according to which there are “no more than two 
kinds of groups of human beings, which we call two cities, according to the special usage of our 
Scriptures,”—and the stress on faith in the Pelagian controversy— “faith itself sets a believer 
apart from one who does not believe”—to see how important boundaries were for his theology.52 
Regarding this participationist ontology of Radical Orthodoxy, Boersma is happier than 
Wisse to describe Augustine as subscribing to a participatory ontology, and one that is not only 
with reference to grace (whether the relation be positive or negative) but also with respect to 
creation. But he draws the interesting point that for Augustine, we do not so much emanate from 
God in a Platonic fashion, but rather come into being from nothing, creatio ex nihilo. He cites 
Augustine from De civitate Dei: “The things he made are good because they were made by him, 
but they are subject to change because they were made not out of his being but out of nothing.”53 
This twofold character supports reading Augustine as observing a strong ontological distinction 
between the creature and the Creator. And just because all creation is a gift of God does not 
necessarily entail that creation and grace are the same gift.54 
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In his fascinating reply to Brachtendorf and Wisse as part of the Ars Disputandi 
colloquium, Hanby acknowledged that in Augustine and Modernity he may have opened himself 
up to the charge that because creation is grace it is sufficient unto itself for salvation. Indeed his 
whole response implicitly distances himself from Milbank, and seems to be a clearer expression 
of Hanby’s settled and considered opinions rather than those in Augustine and Modernity which 
were written under the supervision of Milbank. While not disputing that creation is grace, Hanby 
now adds that it is not “the remedial grace necessary to draw humanity to God from its fallen 
state.” Hanby affirms instead that creatures are “inherently and naturally ordered from the outset 
to what only God can finally give them, that they are made to receive God as gift.”55 While 
Hanby nevertheless states that Augustine and Modernity stands as his “final thoughts” on the 
matter, his reaction piece does show a definite move away from Milbank’s participationist 
ontology, something which is by no means obvious in Augustine and Modernity.56 Hanby does 
observe boundaries here in a way that he was less explicit about in Augustine and Modernity. He 
states that the saved human being receives God as a gift, acknowledging that there is the 
possibility of an intelligible existence prior to the gift of salvation. This does differentiate him 
from Milbank (although Hanby does not acknowledge it), for whom, as we can recall 
“Christianity should not draw boundaries,”57 and: 
the divine gift ... is a gift to no-one, but rather establishes creatures as themselves 
gifts, the divine gift passes across no neutral abyss, no interval of uncertainty during 
which one waits, with bated breath, to see if the destiny of a gift will be realised.58 
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Now, in 2007, Hanby writes of the “significant differences between those writing under the 
auspices of this [Radical Orthodoxy book] series.”59 And while Hanby does not explicitly 
concede any ground, he shows an approach much closer to Boersma and, as our study has 
shown, Augustine. He explains, for instance, that by eliding nature and grace into a single 
economy, he did not mean to collapse the distinction between them, but rather to affirm with 
Augustine in De Natura et Gratia that God’s justice is consistent, whether in saving or 
damning.60 
The question, then, is not whether there is a difference between God and the world, 
whether nature has a legitimate freedom or autonomy, or even whether the world in 
its freedom, autonomy, and being not-God has the capacity to remain indifferent or 
resistant to divine solicitations. Of course it does; it would be blindness to claim 
otherwise, and in fact, I never do. Rather the question—for my critics and, I argue, 
for Augustine against the Pelagians—is whether it is this indifference and this 
capacity for resistance that constitutes the world in its very worldliness, whether the 
‘legitimate autonomy’ of the world consists in this indifference and resistance, or 
rather whether the world and its autonomy find their fulfillment in relation to God 
because this fulfillment answers to their original, intrinsic constitution as creatures.61  
In this clarifying passage, Hanby both acknowledges the essential importance of boundaries, 
while also drawing attention to what he still sees in Brachtendorf and Wisse as “evidence of the 
deep modern anachronisms infecting much of the contemporary treatment of Augustine.”62 
Exploring this disagreement will take us to the final section of this thesis.  
Is Nature and Grace a Zero-Sum Game? 
Hanby’s response to Brachtendorf and Wisse shows a desire both to uphold boundaries and 
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deny universalism and yet nevertheless preserve a participationist ontology in which creatures 
are still ordered towards God, and in which God and humanity do not stand in competition with 
each other. That Wisse and Brachtendorf do not see this is, for Hanby, the “fundamental 
disagreement,” and leads to them (along with much contemporary Augustinian scholarship) 
projecting a modernist metaphysic back on to Augustine in a way that diminishes his thought.63 
Hanby thus agrees with Wisse that Augustine rightly insists upon “the absolute ontological 
difference between God and the world,” but also then wants to add, contra Wisse, that: 
throughout the Pelagian controversy [Augustine] insists that every human act which 
can finally be called ‘good’ is at once the work of the creature and the Creator, that 
there is no moment at which the human contribution to this act can be held in a state 
of reserve as its own private possession, separate from the gift of grace.64  
Or, to frame it in different terms, Hanby wants to establish ontological principles for Augustine 
which are neither Stoic or Pelagian on the one hand, in which nature and operative grace exist in 
competition and man’s nature is defined by his isolation from God making grace a violent 
intrusion, but neither Origenist or Platonic on the other hand, in which ontological boundaries are 
collapsed into emanation and which is ultimately universalistic. Hanby’s response is so 
important to his whole project because he here clearly, and rightly, rejects Milbank’s boundary-
less Christianity, while also, rightly, sticking to his earlier guns in challenging some of 
contemporary Augustinian studies’ modernist, zero-sum game approach to God and man, or 
nature and grace. In doing this, Hanby employs the Incarnational analogy: 
For there is a deep analogy between the question of how an act can be at once divine 
and human without compromising the difference between God and the world and the 
question of how the Son can become incarnate without sacrificing genuine divinity or 
humanity, even if there remains an infinite difference between Christ our Head and 
us, his Body—a difference I adamantly affirm. Or put differently, if one can offer a 
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coherent account of how the Son could become incarnate without violating either his 
divinity or humanity, one can offer a coherent account of how the graced act could be 
at once God’s and mine, and more finally and fully the latter for being the former.65  
With reference to our own study of Augustine’s De Natura et Gratia, Hanby here offers a 
compelling vision for understanding the logic behind Augustine’s anti-Pelagian concerns. As we 
noted, Augustine was concerned to prevent nature and grace from being seen to exist only in 
competition, as a zero-sum game. 
[W]e do not take away the choice of the will, but we proclaim the grace of God. Who 
benefits from all these things, unless they are willing? But they must be willing with 
humility and not raise themselves up with pride over the powers of the will, as if it 
alone were sufficient for the perfection of righteousness.66 
As we have seen, Augustine would come to summarize De Natura et Gratia in the Retractiones 
as a work in which he “did not defend grace in opposition to nature, but the grace by which 
nature is set free and ruled.”67 Indeed within Augustine’s thought there are indications that both 
Pelagianism and Platonism suffer from a similar disease. The Pelagians make nature grace, and 
the Platonists make grace natural.68 This is the choice that John Milbank had posed, identifying 
the former with German theology, and the latter with his favored French theology.69 But Hanby 
points to a more helpful way:  
It is this dissimilarity [between God and the world], this ontological discontinuity, the 
fact that God is not really but freely and contingently related to the world that makes 
it possible to think of both the incarnation, and by analogy, a doctrine of grace that at 
once constitutes, perfects, and completes nature in its very naturality while remaining 
entirely distinct and gratuitous. Were I now to argue this independently of Augustine, 
I would take recourse to the Thomist distinction between the esse ipsum subsistens of 
                                                 
 
65 Hanby, “A Response,” 16. 
66 Nat. et gr., 32.36.  
67 Augustine, Retr., 2.68.42. Vanneste is wrong when he suggests that in De Natura et Gratia nature and 
grace are “deux réalités opposées, voire en quelque sorte ennemies (two opposite realities, even somewhat hostile).” 
Vanneste, Nature et Grâce, 41. 
68 See, for example, Augustine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 25. 
69 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 207. 
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God himself and the esse creatum non subsistens of the world to account for how we 
might think of the world as being at once possessed of its own being while being 
nonetheless intrinsically constituted in relation to God and dependent for its 
fulfillment as world on the gift of grace. And it is on this basis that I would contend, 
perhaps more strongly than I did in the book, for a genuine sense of creaturely, 
human—and by extension, philosophical—‘autonomy’, founded not in a fictional 
independence from God, but rather precisely in its embrace of its need for and 
dependence upon God.70 
Hanby’s response thus rehabilitates his project with valuable corrections against the Milbankian 
extremes, while also denying, along with Augustine, that the relationship of nature to grace is a 
zero-sum game. While Pelagius had assumed man is naturally free, for Augustine it was God’s 
grace which made our wills cling to God and so find freedom.71 Nature was, without grace, 
directed away from God, even opposed to him, and enslaved to sin.72 The grace of Christ Jesus, 
won on the cross, is in no way within us. And yet, it does lead to our freedom, even to the 
fullness of our being, strengthening and activating our nature, without replacing it. Grace never 
threatens our deepest nature, or compromises our freedom but rather enables it. Because the two 
do not exist in competition, the gift of grace can be fully undeserved, unmerited and unexpected, 
while also being more welcome than a brick wall which we might inadvertently run into. Grace 
is extra nos, but not extraneous to our natures which are set free by grace when we receive it 
through faith. The victory of Augustine over Pelagius, then, was not necessarily a victory of 
                                                 
 
70 Hanby, “A Response,” 17. 
71 See Nat. et gr., 12.13. Portalié seems to be on to a good thing when he writes: “[I]n the Pelagian struggle 
Augustine perceived immediately the danger of compromising freedom of the will by exalting the role of grace; he 
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grace over nature, nor a full elision of the two.73 Nor was it just about grace, per se, given that 
Pelagius could affirm that it is by grace that we are forgiven by Jesus Christ, especially in 
baptism.74 In this sense Hanby is indeed right to see that it was not just grace, but the ontological 
foundation of God’s economy of creation and grace which was at the heart of the controversy. 
We earlier noted one paradox of Augustine's anthropology, namely, of subjectivity leading to 
objectivity. Here there is another paradox which de Lubac too affirmed, namely that freedom is 
not intrinsic to our nature but is received as, by grace, it submits to God. This allows us to read 
Augustine intelligibly, in contrast to the confusion Gerald Bonner has when he writes of “two 
distinct theologies” in Augustine which he reads as opposing each other. The first is that of 
participation in God’s life, the other of pessimism regarding the human condition to perform 
anything at all.75 But a proper understanding of nature and grace not only harmonizes these two 
supposedly distinct theologies, but brings them into an essential relationship with each other. 
Recalling the work of Henri de Lubac with which this study began, we can see Hanby as 
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74 E.g. Nat. et gr., 18.20. For a discussion, see Evans, Pelagius, 16. 
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sharing in a similar pattern—reacting strongly against the modernist dualisms in Augustinian 
studies as well as more generally in political and religious life, only to see later on more clearly 
the dangers of the postmodern collapsing of distinctions and boundaries. Hanby’s stress in 2007 
on the importance of dissimilarity and ontological discontinuity in Augustine mirrors de Lubac’s 
own mature rejection of both ‘contingentist theories’ and Platonist theories. It is worth re-quoting 
de Lubac here, citing Jacques Maritain: 
Despite all that has been said to the contrary, we must certainly maintain that ‘St 
Augustine taught as clearly as possible the ontological value of the distinction 
between nature and grace’; ‘he clearly affirmed that distinction even for the state of 
innocence’. The definitely and intrinsically supernatural character of divine adoption 
is one of the fundamental elements in his teaching; it is expressed there so clearly, 
and so insistently, that we should be astonished to find that it has not always been 
recognized.76 
In light of passages like this, it is hard to imagine de Lubac approving of Milbank as the 
interpreter of his Augustinian thought. A faithful reading of de Lubac will remember him not 
only as the one who challenged the idea of natura pura but also as one who rejected the 
collapsing of distinctions between nature and grace, especially if attributed to Augustine. Does 
Augustine simply stand as a wax nose in these debates, able to lend the authority of the 
“Augustinian” tag in whichever way someone wishes to coopt him? It is hard to deny that the 
contested space of what is genuinely Augustinian sometimes tends to reflect the theological and 
confessional commitments of its challengers. Approaches to Augustine which sideline the 
“exegetical” will only perpetuate this error. But that is not to say that the Augustinian “exegetes” 
always get him right. As Hanby has convincingly shown, in order to understand Augustine on 
nature and grace, one must give full attention to the broader ontological visions of Augustine and 
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Pelagius.  
Against Milbank and other Platonic sympathizers, Augustine is clear in De Natura et 
Gratia that faulty attempts to defend God’s creation as fully graced end up rejecting the cross 
and the mercy of the physician. “Hence, we should not praise the creator so that we are forced to 
say, indeed so that we are found guilty of saying, that the savior is unnecessary (superfluum).”77 
The savior is always necessary because our redemption can only come by a grace that is extra 
nos, and different from the created gift. But against those who would see Augustine as positing a 
natural autonomy that is fully intelligible without reference to grace, a natura pura, Augustine in 
De Natura et Gratia also bears witness to a non-competitive relationship between nature and 
grace. In this relationship, nature is set free by grace. In its lack caused by sin, nature reveals 
grace to be not extraneous or superfluous but its fulfilment.78 
.
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